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**Global Green Growth Institute**  
Thirteenth Meeting of the MPSC  
June 7-11, 2021 | E-Consultations  
June 17, 2021 | Virtual Meeting

## **Summary of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Management and Program Sub-Committee**

1. The Thirteenth Meeting of the Management and Program Sub-Committee (MPSC13) was held in two parts: Part 1 in the form of e-consultations on June 7-11, 2021, and Part 2 as a virtual meeting on June 17, 2021. The agenda of the meeting is attached as Annex 1.
2. Annex 3 provides a list of sessional documents, and Annex 4 provides the full list of questions and comments from Members and observers, and responses from the Secretariat during the e-consultations.

### PART I. E-CONSULTATIONS

3. Delegates of the 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Management and Program Sub-Committee (MPSC) and GGGI engaged in a five-day e-consultations on June 7-11, 2021, and below is the summary of suggestions and action items. The full list of questions and comments from delegates and responses from GGGI can be found in Annex 1.
4. GGGI thanked MPSC Members for their comprehensive list of 122 questions and comments and hopes that the responses assembled by the GGGI staff at short notice are helpful and satisfactory. GGGI invites Members to follow up during the meeting if they have additional questions or request further clarifications, but also will be pleased to respond to such questions after the meeting if the meeting time is insufficient to respond to all questions.

### **Item 1. Director-General's Progress Report**

5. ***Linking GGGI's outputs to tangible impact:*** UK encouraged GGGI to continue to set progressively stretching targets and develop a stronger narrative on how its outputs led to tangible impact. The Director General agreed and provided examples where stretch targets have been set in the past and indicates he intends to continue to do so in close consultation with Council and MPSC. He also indicated that the shift GGGI has made from reporting on intermediate outcomes (counting policies and resources mobilized), to reporting in terms of Strategic Outcomes linked to SDGs and NDCs is the key cultural change that will enable GGGI to link its outputs to tangible impacts.
6. ***Progress on achieving results and mobilizing funding during COVID:*** Many delegates complimented GGGI on its ability to deliver results and increase funding during the challenging COVID conditions. The DG noted that he indeed admires and appreciates the hard work of staff, Members and partners to keep GGGI's work going during the challenging pandemic, but that he also notes that mobilizing resources and delivering results takes a long time. Many development partners have a 2-year process from first idea submission to contract signing, and for new donors that provided resources to GGGI recently for the first time (such as New Zealand and France) the process from first meetings to signed contracts took about four years. For bankable projects to be developed takes years after projects have started. This explains how many new contracts could be signed during a pandemic year. It also explains why landscape projects are large in the investment

portfolio (as GGGI had large, earmarked landscape projects since 2015-16) and finally it explains why it takes rather a long time to develop new areas of expertise and lead them to have impact at scale.

7. **Reporting on strategic partnerships:** Norway suggested to report on strategic partnerships with other organizations or initiatives on advancing the green growth agenda. The DG agreed to initiate more explicit reporting on this matter in its Annual Report and possibly a separate report, and make a proposal to the Council in October to initiate such reporting over its 2021 activities.
8. **Positioning GGGI to influence global policy on building back better:** UK suggested to explore opportunities to take a central position in the global debate around environmentally sustainable and climate compatible growth, influencing global policy on building back better. The DG responded he agrees and GGGI will seek opportunities to do so where it can, within the limited resources available for global policy work. He is ready to discuss with the Council and MPSC on re-prioritizing the allocation of GGGI's limited resources, if desired, as they are currently predominantly focused on strengthening advocacy for green growth and green recovery at the national level, as per guidance from the Council and MPSC.
9. **Deepening analysis on quality and skill levels of employment generated:** UK encouraged to deepen thinking around both the quality and skill levels of employment being generated, as well as any spatial or temporal disconnect between job creation and destruction. GGGI agreed and indicated that it has incorporated these issues in its analyses and the support we provide to Members and partners.
10. **Strengthening cost efficiency and quality:** Norway advised that while raising the bar and scaling up seems timely, it should be done with care and consideration with solid risk assessments. Also, cost efficiency and quality rather than quantity should be the guiding principles on making decisions on targets and ambitions. The DG agreed on both points.
11. **Sharing a wider focus in the progress report:** Denmark suggested the progress report to have greater focus on nature-based solutions, climate adaptation, and general sustainability, as a wider focus would better reflect the work of GGGI. The DG agreed the Progress Report provides a snapshot of key issues, rather than a comprehensive overview. In an effort to reduce the length of all MPSC (and Council) documents, as requested, GGGI has generally provided shorter meeting documents, with more comprehensive information in Annexes, The DG would be pleased to receive feedback on the most effective format of the DG Progress Report and other MPSC/Council documents, i.e. aiming for shorter, or more comprehensive formats.

## Item 2. Results Report 2020

12. **Integrating evaluations and risk updates in future Results Reports:** Norway noted the Results Report does not include information on evaluations conducted and reporting on risks. GGGI responded that the Results Reports will cover these matters going forward.
13. **Tracking performance and measuring impact:** UK suggested that the impact pathway approach be backdated, where possible, to allow better tracking of GGGI's performance across the two incomparable results frameworks. UK further advised to place greater emphasis on the list of 2020 outcomes in table 1 of the report and develop infographics to replace the outdated monitoring on page 5. GGGI noted both suggestions and advised that the impact pathway approach has indeed been designed to be "backdated", enabling evaluations, and indicated relevant changes will be made to coincide with the implementation of Strategy 2030 and CRF 2021-2025.
14. **Capturing nature/environmental outcomes:** UK asked GGGI to consider incorporating a Strategic Outcome (SO) capturing the need to consider nature/environmental outcomes. GGGI responded that the current SO in theory enables capturing these outcomes, but in practice the available

information leads to the use of very simple indicators. GGGI will follow the discussion and adopt more sophisticated indicators for this SO when they become available. While GGGI aims to keep a limited number of SOs, it can improve the indicators used, and also use many more detailed indicators at project level, as well as in its work in Green Growth Index and Simulation Tool.

15. ***Increasing support for adaptation and resilience building:*** UK suggested GGGI to explore new opportunities to reduce a country's vulnerability to climate change, which is particularly pertinent in the global south, and to establish a stronger narrative on the link between adaptation and green growth. GGGI acknowledged and informed that it has initiated action to broaden its support for climate adaptation, particularly for SIDS and LDCs.
16. ***Integrating focus on vulnerable groups in strengthening gender mainstreaming:*** UK encouraged GGGI to strengthen the application of gender equality and mainstream gender indicators in all its projects and to report on its performance against gender targets in all relevant outputs, such as the Annual Report. Denmark suggested to add a focus on vulnerable groups to the focus on gender mainstreaming. GGGI agreed to both suggestions and informed that it is working on: (a) Strengthening quality gender design features with quality targets and indicators, reporting with gender disaggregated data, and building gender awareness and capacity across the organization; and (b) Building internal capacity to better apply gender and poverty markers is a key priority in implementing its Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy and Action Plan.

### Item 3. Overview of Work Program 2021

17. ***Sharing knowledge products widely:*** UK encouraged GGGI to explore how its knowledge products can be shared as public goods. It also suggested keeping track of how their outputs are used in the wider evidence base, tracking the number of downloads of reports, and number of citations. GGGI noted the suggestion (also see paragraph 19).
18. ***Increasing core resources to LDCs:*** Denmark encouraged to develop a larger pipeline for Africa, considering the 50% target of allocation core resources to LDCs. GGGI agreed, also noting that GGGI supports LDCs as well as other vulnerable countries outside Africa, notably SIDS.

### Item 4. Strategy 2015-2020 Review

19. ***Monitoring impact of bankable projects and lessons learnt:*** UK said that GGGI needs to better monitor the impact of its bankable projects after the organization's exit, as capturing the results, lessons learnt and data from such projects are necessary to monitor GGGI's total impact. GGGI agreed, and while it has been tracking the implementation of green investments catalyzed from 2017 onwards, it will continue to explore various feasible approaches to capture key results and lessons learnt for ex-post assessment (also see paragraph 25).
20. ***Leveraging collaboration, experience and lessons learnt for replication and scaling up:*** UK suggested FCDO and GGGI work together to understand how GGGI can better leverage experiences and lessons learnt from working with Members to inform capacity building of other countries, demonstrate evidence of strong results that can be replicated, and leverage learnings across context. GGGI responded it looks forward to working with FCDO in this regard.
21. ***Monitoring the impact of GGGI's knowledge products:*** UK encouraged GGGI to consider ways to measure the extent of its knowledge products impacting the quality of Members' green growth policies and investment proposals, and suggested that GGGI and FCDO work together to establish a metric to measure the quality of GGGI's knowledge products. UK also encouraged GGGI to develop a tracking mechanism to measure how its products are being used to influence the global narrative around green growth. GGGI responded it looks forward to working with FCDO and other parties in this regard.

**Item 5. Strategy 2030 Addendum (Part 1)**

22. ***Remaining relevant to Members and becoming a carbon neutral organization:*** Korea confirmed that the main elements of GGGI's Strategy 2030 are still valid even after the COVID-19 pandemic, and reaffirmed the Korean government's continued support for GGGI to follow through on the Strategy 2030, and its NetZero ambitions.
23. ***Increasing GGGI's adaptation portfolio:*** UK said GGGI should explore opportunities to increase its adaptation portfolio. GGGI acknowledged that adaptation is the top priority for its vulnerable countries, and GGGI will continue efforts to scale up adaptation and resilience building support to Members and partners in collaboration with donors, particularly for SIDS and LDCs. It noted that Climate Smart Agriculture has been developed as a priority for adaptation and there are now a number of projects, just starting up, which is expected to lead to rapid growth in this key area for Africa, and for adaptation.

**Item 6. Regional Strategies**

24. ***Developing regional and multi-country programming:*** UK encouraged GGGI to continue to develop a higher-level cross-country approach with a focus on regional and multi-country programming, as well as forums for lesson learning, across all regional strategies. In doing so, the UK advised GGGI to coordinate with other organizations to avoid duplication of activities. UK also suggested that GGGI and FCDO collaborate to identify milestones that can track progress specific to this aim. GGGI agreed it should strengthen the regional approach. This has been in progress for several years, since the establishment of regional offices, and the assignment of staff to regions, or multiple countries, and the development of regional projects where possible. It looks forward to working with FCDO in this regard.
25. ***Mapping of strategies:*** Mr. Ariyaratne Hewage suggested to consider including a world map indicating the different strategies of the countries in an appropriate manner. GGGI agreed to this suggestion.

**Item 7. Update on NDCs, LTS and Green New Deal**

26. Delegates welcomed GGGI's work on heightening ambitions in NDCs, the mainstreaming of gender and social inclusion issues into NDCs and the mapping of green recovery plans to NDC implementation.

**Item 8. Review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts (Part 1)**

27. ***Tracking of social and environmental impacts, and monitoring after GGGI's exit:*** UK indicated that projects need to be better monitored after GGGI's exit, as capturing the results, lessons learnt, and data from such projects are necessary to monitor GGGI's total impact. GGGI agreed on the importance of tracking the social and environmental impacts of GGGI-generated projects, and this information is captured and examined in various reports including the annual results reports, evaluations of country programs, and evaluations for specific thematic areas.

**Item 9. Update on the Use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds in GGGI**

28. ***Assessing the capacity of the Steering Committee:*** Norway noted the need for an assessment whether the Steering Committee (SC) has the capacity and competence undertake the indicated tasks, or if there is need for an advisory group or Secretary function to assist the SC. GGGI agreed to assess the capacity of the SC to provide proper oversight on a case-by-case basis. Norway also pointed out that all donors need to have a voice in the SC, and GGGI agreed.

**Item 10. Update on Accountability and Safeguards**

29. **Publicizing GGGI's efforts on accountability and safeguards:** Mr. Hewage suggested GGGI to widely publicize GGGI's efforts to strengthen environmental and social safeguards. GGGI agreed and informed that GGGI's website is currently housing GGGI's commitments and policies.
30. **Expanding reporting on poverty eradication and gender inclusion:** UK encouraged GGGI to explore opportunities to expand reporting on results related to poverty eradication and gender inclusion, specifically highlighting the impact of GGGI programming on marginalized groups. GGGI agreed this is a priority for GGGI and is in alignment with its new Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy 2021-2025 and Action Plan 2021-2022.
31. **Exploring gender, poverty, and inclusion as core objectives:** UK further suggested GGGI explore programmatic solutions with gender inclusion as the core delivery objective, as part of the wider just transition. GGGI responded that GGGI is also interested in exploring with Members and partners a portfolio of projects that have gender, poverty, and inclusion as principal objectives.
32. **Taking a step further to "do good":** Norway suggested GGGI to not only consider safeguarding as identifying and managing risks in line with the principle of "do no harm," but take a step further to "do good" and strengthen environmental and social concerns in project design whenever applicable. GGGI agreed and reiterated that these principles are embedded in GGGI's Rules on Sustainability and Safeguards.

#### **Item 11. Update on Membership, Accession and Country Programming**

33. **Keeping cost efficiency and value for money central to scaling up and expansion:** Despite Members' previous concerns of growing membership and spreading resources too thin, Norway positively noted GGGI's success in achieving results and the possibility for GGGI to expand even further. In this regard, Norway stressed the importance of considering cost efficiency and value for money when scaling up and expanding. GGGI agreed and said that GGGI seeks to maximize impact with its core resources by 1) securing earmarked funding for country program expansion, and 2) working in alliance with in-country and global institutions that expand GGGI's reach and provide complementary efforts to scale up impact.

#### **Item 12. Revision of the MPSC Terms of Reference**

34. Delegates agreed on the revisions proposed by the Secretariat.

#### **Item 13. Upcoming Elections of the Council for 2022-2023**

35. Denmark, Norway, ROK and UK proposed that the MPSC recommend to the Council for Mr. Ban Ki-moon to serve a third two-year term as Expert/Non-State Actor Member of the Council and President of the Assembly & Chair of the Council. GGGI noted that the follow up actions are: 1) for the Council to re-elect Mr. Ban to a third term as Expert/NSA Member (as it can within existing rules); and 2) for the Assembly and the Council to then re-elect Mr. Ban as President and Chair, respectively.
36. Mr. Hewage expressed his interest to serve a second term as a Non-State Actor/Expert Member of the Council for 2022-2023. GGGI noted this with thanks.

#### **Item 14. Update on the 10<sup>th</sup> Assembly and 14<sup>th</sup> Council Joint Session**

37. UK recommended option 2 (19:00-22:00 KST) for the time of the Joint Session.

PART II. VIRTUAL MEETING

**Agenda 1. Opening of the Meeting and Adoption of the Agenda**

38. The virtual meeting was chaired by Mr. Tong-q Lee, Director-General for Climate Change, Energy, Environment and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. Participating Members included the MPSC Members Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Korea, Paraguay, United Kingdom, Mr. Ariyaratne Hewage and Mr. Boonam Shin, as well as Norway, one of two Audit Contact Points of the MPSC, and observing Members of Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Hungary, and Peru. The full list of participants can be found as Annex 2.
39. Members of the MPSC adopted the agenda as contained in MPSC/2021/AG/1.

**Agenda 2. Summary of E-Consultations**

40. Delegates commended GGGI for its exceptional performance despite an incredibly challenging year in 2020, noting GGGI quickly responded to shifting priorities in a highly uncertain environment showing its strength of a flexible and nimble organization. Delegates also commended GGGI for recognizing the opportunity to integrate both climate and development objectives into recovery packages.
41. Mr. Boonam Shin encouraged GGGI to continue preparing for the post-pandemic and diversifying its donors, and to consider GGGI's future role as a global thought leader in promoting green economy as also suggested by UK during e-consultations. The Director-General agreed, while noting that there was strong guidance from MPSC and Council for GGGI to prioritize instead on providing direct support to Members at the national level. Meanwhile, the Director-General informed that GGGI has maintained a limited thought leadership function to develop tools for its country work and to share knowledge.
42. Mr. Ariyaratne Hewage suggested that GGGI consider the element of human development in the process of green growth, in light of the current pandemic situation. He asked how GGGI can look into issues such as health and living conditions especially for low-income groups. The Director-General responded that GGGI has been defining green growth as not only low-carbon development, but "sustainable and inclusive growth." He informed that GGGI has a significant number of activities on poverty reduction and employment generation that focuses on supporting SMEs and green entrepreneurship. These activities are evidence of the organization considering the element of human development under the heading of inclusive development.
43. The ROK, reflecting on GGGI's experience throughout 2020, expressed hope that the current global challenges will continue to present opportunities for GGGI, and encouraged GGGI to make use of this critical moment to make its leap towards 2030. The Director-General agreed that the focus on green recovery is an excellent opportunity for GGGI, particularly with "green" being on the top of the global agenda, and that GGGI is a growing organization meeting the demands of Member governments for additional services.
44. The Director-General also highlighted delegates' comments in the e-consultations that several Members expressed their wish for Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the incumbent President of the Assembly and Chair of the Council, to serve for a third term. The Director-General explained that the election for Mr. Ban's third term does not require any special procedure, and the Secretariat will make preparations so Members of the Council can elect Mr. Ban as an Expert/Non-State Actor Member of the Council for a third term and subsequently the Assembly and the Council can elect him as President and Chair, respectively.

45. Members of the MPSC took note of:
- a. the Director-General's Progress Report;
  - b. 2020 Results Report;
  - c. Overview of Work Program 2021;
  - d. Review of Strategy 2015-2020;
  - e. GGGI's Regional Strategies;
  - f. GGGI's work on NDCs, LTS and Green New Deal;
  - g. Update on the use of multi-donor trust funds in GGGI;
  - h. Update on Accountability and Safeguards;
  - i. Update on membership, accession and country programming in GGGI;
  - j. Upcoming elections of the Council for 2022-2023; and
  - k. Update on the 10<sup>th</sup> Assembly and 14<sup>th</sup> Council Joint Session.
46. Members of the MPSC agreed to recommend that the Council approve the revised Terms of Reference of the MPSC.

### **Agenda 3. 2020 Financial Results**

47. The ROK welcomed earmarked funding expanding to now exceed the amount of core funding in the 2020 expenditure report, recalling GGGI presented to Members only a few years ago that it aims to place greater focus on raising earmarked funding. The ROK positively noted that GGGI is on a healthy track in terms of its financial status.
48. The ROK asked whether the external auditors for the financial statements were re-contracted. GGGI reminded that external auditors are appointed for three years; KPMG was GGGI's external auditor until year 2018; and PwC was appointed for audit beginning with FY2019. After the audit for FY2021, GGGI will be tendering for new auditors.
49. The UK congratulated GGGI for its increased funding in 2020 despite challenges of COVID-19, and asked whether GGGI expects the shift from core to earmarked to be a continuing trend. GGGI responded that the trend is likely to continue, reminding delegates the earmarked funding target of 50% set by the Council for Strategy 2015-2020. GGGI also informed delegates that, while core funding is difficult to raise, GGGI introduced Programmatic Earmarked Funding," which is earmarked for a specific region or purpose but in less detail than bilateral earmarked projects. Such "in-between core and earmarked funding" can attract new donors willing to contribute for a specific region, such as Africa, or a specific purpose, such as nature-based solutions. Such funding has already been provided by New Zealand and Denmark, and the Korea Green New Deal Fund that GGGI created with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) of the ROK would also fall under the category of programmatic earmarked funding.
50. Members of the MPSC took note of the 2020 Financial Results of GGGI.

### **Agenda 4. 2021 Operational Budget**

51. ROK inquired whether GGGI's estimate for its earmarked expenditures in 2021 are based on similar expectations in 2020, or if other variables have been taken into account. GGGI explained that the estimate for 2021 is based on actual expenditures up to the end of May, taking into consideration the rate of expenditures and the current pipeline. GGGI further explained that at the beginning of the year, GGGI puts all its potential income from contracts into its budget, and achieving 90% of its expenditure target is actually very high for earmarked portfolios as delays in implementation are quite common. Achieving 90% implementation for earmarked portfolio is the best performance—and GGGI currently hiring a large number of people indicates that it is pushing to deliver the

portfolio of projects it has.

52. Members of the MPSC took note of the 2021 Operational Budget of GGGI.

#### **Agenda 5. Strategy 2030 Addendum (Part 2)**

53. On the possibility of GGGI offsetting its carbon footprint to become carbon neutral by purchasing a limited amount of carbon credits, delegates asked if GGGI is planning to use its finances to make such a purchase and whether this should be pursued. GGGI explained that its goal, as set in Strategy 2030, is to reduce its carbon footprint by 40%. As a result of the pandemic, GGGI has been able to reduce its emissions much more than that in 2020 and has offset the remainder for USD6K. Going forward the goal remains to reduce emissions to the maximum possible, but Management is asking MPSC for advice whether offsetting the remainder in coming years (estimated at USD15-20K) could be permitted. The ROK and the UK asked for time to have internal discussions on this matter.
54. GGGI raised that perhaps it should not go back to pre-COVID travel but should continue to make significant use of its virtual meetings even after travel restrictions are lifted. GGGI Management intends to reduce the frequency of in-person staff meetings from once per year to once in 2 years, for example. GGGI asked for MPSC guidance on whether the Assembly and Council Joint Sessions should be convened as an in-person meeting once every two years, with in-person Joint Sessions taking place in the alternate years the Work Program and Budget is approved by the Council. For every other year, the Joint Session would be organized as a hybrid meeting where delegates outside of Korea are invited to join virtually and delegates in Seoul may choose to join in person. The ROK, Paraguay, and UK agreed. GGGI will propose the same to Council.
55. Paraguay requested that the close advisory team on site be maintained, at least until the capacity to prepare projects on the environment at the technical level are built. In the case of Paraguay, close collaboration is ongoing with the GGGI Regional Office based in Mexico in its capacity as a Delivery Partner for the GCF Readiness Program in Paraguay.<sup>1</sup>
56. Members of the MPSC endorsed the Strategy 2030 Addendum and recommended that the Council approve the Addendum.

#### **Agenda 6. Review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts (Part 2)**

57. Members of the MPSC took note of the review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts.

#### **Agenda 7. 2020 Audited Financial Statements (closed session)**

58. Members of the MPSC and Audit Contact Points held a closed room discussion with the external auditors of GGGI.
59. Members of the MPSC agreed to recommend to the Council the approval of GGGI's 2020 Audited Financial Statements.

#### **Agenda 8. Any Other Business**

60. The ROK shared the outcome of the P4G Seoul Summit, and thanked GGGI for its contribution to the success of the Summit. The ROK shared 67 leaders around the world and 200+ experts and representatives from government, youth and civil society participated in the Summit and various side events. Furthermore, the ROK noted the key achievement of the Summit, which was the

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<sup>1</sup> This intervention by Paraguay was submitted in written form after the virtual meeting.

adoption of the Seoul declaration, with the support of both US and China.

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Annex:

1. Agenda
2. List of Participants
3. List of Sessional Documents
4. Full List of Questions, Comments and Responses in E-consultations

## Annex 1. Agenda

**Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Meeting of the  
Management and Program Sub-Committee (MPSC)**

*At a Glance*

*E-Consultations – June 7-11, 2021*

Items
Item 1. Director-General's Progress Report
Item 2. Results Report 2020
Item 3. Overview of Work Program 2021
Item 4. Strategy 2015-2020 Review
Item 5. Strategy 2030 Addendum (Part 1)
Item 6. Regional Strategies
Item 7. Update on NDCs, LTS and Green New Deal
Item 8. Review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts (Part 1)
Item 9. Update on the Use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds in GGGI
Item 10. Accountability and Safeguards
Item 11. Update on Membership, Accession and Country Programming
Item 12. Revisions to the MPSC Terms of Reference
Item 13. Upcoming Elections of the Council for 2022-2023
Item 14. Update on the 10 <sup>th</sup> Assembly and 14 <sup>th</sup> Council Joint Session

*Virtual Meeting – June 17, 2021*

Time	Agenda
20:00-20:10	Agenda 1. Opening of the Meeting and Adoption of the Agenda
20:10-20:30	Agenda 2. Summary of E-Consultations
20:30-20:50	Agenda 3. 2020 Financial Results
20:50-21:10	Agenda 4. 2021 Operational Budget
21:10-21:30	Agenda 5. Strategy 2030 Addendum (Part 2)
21:30-21:40	<i>Break</i>
21:40-22:00	Agenda 6. Review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts (Part 2)
22:00-22:20	Agenda 7. Any Other Business
22:20-22:40	Agenda 8. 2020 Audited Financial Statements (closed session)
22:40-22:45	Agenda 9. Closing

**Annex 2. List of Participants**MPSC Members*Côte d'Ivoire*

- H.E. Sylvestre Kouassi Bile, Ambassador of CIV to Korea
- Mr. Gangone Alphonse Koue Bi, First Counsellor, Embassy of CIV to Korea
- Ms. Ange Patricia Adiko, Deputy Director, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development

*Korea*

- Mr. Tong-q Lee, Director-General, MOFA
- Mr. Chang-soo Kim, Director, MOFA
- Mr. Hyuk Jeon, Second Secretary, MOFA
- Ms. Mikyeong Kim, Second Secretary, MOFA

*Paraguay*

- Mr. Luis Molinas, Charge d'Affairs a.i., Embassy of Paraguay to Korea
- Ms. Catherine Piris, Second Secretary, Embassy of Paraguay to Korea

*United Kingdom*

- Ms. Emma Gallagher, Deputy Team Leader of Smart Green Growth Team, Climate and Environment Directorate, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
- Mr. Rahi Islam, Economist, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

*Mr. Ariyaratne Hewage*

- Mr. Ariyaratne Hewage, Non-State Actor/Expert Member of the Council

*Mr. Boonam Shin*

- Mr. Boonam Shin, Non-State Actor/Expert Member of the Council

Observers*Cambodia*

- H.E. Amida Prak, Deputy Secretary-General, Ministry of Environment

*Costa Rica*

- H.E. Alejandro Rodríguez Zamora, Ambassador of Costa Rica to Korea
- Mr. Jorge Valerio, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Costa Rica to Korea

*Denmark*

- Mr. Henrik Silkjaer Nielsen, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Denmark to Korea

*Hungary*

- Mr. István Musza, STI Counsellor, Embassy of Hungary to Korea
- Ms. Veronika Bagi, Climate Policy Desk Officer, Ministry for Innovation and Technology

*Norway (Audit Contact Point)*

- Mr. John Erik Prydz, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Climate and Environment
- Ms. Kristine Stubberud, Senior Adviser, Norad

*Peru*

- Ms. Yveth Villanueva, Cooperation Specialist, Ministry of Environment

GGGI Secretariat

- Dr. Frank Rijsberman, Director-General
- Ms. Jenny Hyoeun Kim, Deputy Director-General and Head of GGPI
- Mr. Gerard O'Donoghue, Assistant Director-General and Head of OED
- Dr. Kyungnam Shin, Assistant Director-General and Head of IPSD
- Mr. Dave Kim, Governance Lead, Office of the Director-General
- Ms. Ingvild Solvang, Head Of Climate Action And Inclusive Development Global Practice
- Ms. Jinyoung Kim, Director of Asia
- Mr. Lasse Ringius, Head of Green Investment Services
- Mr. Mahamadou Tounkara, Director, Office of the Director-General
- Ms. Nayoung Moon, Governance Officer, Office of the Director-General

## Annex 3. List of Sessional Documents

<a href="#">MPSC/2021/AG/1/REV</a>	Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Meeting of the MPSC
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/1</a>	DG Progress Report
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/2</a>	Results Report 2020
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/3</a>	Overview of Work Program 2021
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/4</a>	Strategy 2015-2020 Review
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/5</a>	Strategy 2030 Addendum
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/6</a>	Regional Strategies
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/7</a>	Update on NDCs, LTS and Green New Deal
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/8</a>	Review of GGGI's Green Investment Work
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/9</a>	Update on the Use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/10</a>	Accountability and Safeguards
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/11</a>	Membership, Accession and Country Programming
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/12</a>	Revision of the MPSC Terms of Reference
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/13</a>	Upcoming Elections of the Council for 2022-2023
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/14</a>	Update on the 10th Assembly and 14th Council Joint Session
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/15</a>	Summary of E-Consultations
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/16-1</a>	2020 GGGI Financial Results
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/16-2</a>	2020 Audited Financial Statements
<a href="#">MPSC/2021/17</a>	2021 GGGI Operational Budget



Thirteenth Meeting of the Management and Program Sub-Committee  
E-Consultations | June 7-11, 2021

### Questions, Comments and Responses for MPSC13 E-Consultations

1. Director-General's Progress Report		
Member	Questions/Comments	Responses
Cote d'Ivoire	1. Regarding carbon neutrality, which is a commitment of the Paris Climate Agreement, the Director General referred to NetZero2050. While welcoming this ambitious project, we think that it would be more effective to set short-term deadlines to get on track for long-term targets.	We agree that long term targets without short term actions have only limited value. In addition to NetZero2050 LT targets, all countries need NDC commitments for 2030 in line with NetZero2050 – assessed by IPCC as 45-50% GHG emission reduction globally. All NDC commitments then need to be backed by clear roadmaps for implementation, with associated policies, investments and financing. GGGI supports its members to have both short-term actions, medium term commitments and long term targets in place.
Republic of Korea	2. First of all, the Korean government would like to express its sincere gratitude to GGGI for contributing to the success of the P4G Seoul Summit held on May 30th to 31st. We appreciate DG Rijsberman's intervention in the Leaders' Session as well as his role moderating the session with the SG of GCF and the Climate Amb. We are also grateful for the engagement of GGGI in the Green Future Week sessions.	Thank you.
	3. We appreciate that GGGI is supporting a range of countries with dedicated green recovery efforts and would like to see that these efforts transform into foundations for countries to move towards longer term climate policies such as carbon neutrality goals.	Agreed. It goes both ways, we advocate both using existing NDC roadmaps as a basis for green recovery, and see green recovery as a means to, in turn, accelerate the green transformation in general, and climate action in particular.
	4. We are happy that the Ministry of Economy and Finance will establish a Green New Deal Trust Fund at GGGI. We welcome that GGGI launched projects funded by new donors such as New Zealand, Canada and	Agreed, the program earmarked resources we received from New Zealand and expect to get for the Green New Deal Trust Fund provide a strong foundation for expanding GGGI's work to support its members. We see the program earmarked resources as a

	France while continuing its efforts to expand financial resources.	valuable new type of funding for GGGI, in between fully flexible core support and fully earmarked project support. We also agree we need a pro-active approach to continue expanding both the volume of financial resources and the number of donors we have seen in the past several years.
	5. We also extend our warm welcome to Dr. Kyung Nam Shin. We look forward to his contributions to strengthen GGGI's partnerships with other institutions.	Thank you.
United Kingdom	6. The FCDO congratulates GGGI on their exceptional performance so far. In collaboration with key stakeholders, GGGI should continue to set progressively stretching targets which take into account the difficult local contexts GGGI often work in, setting targets which are well suited to their ambition and growth as an institution whilst being attainable. Whilst also developing a stronger narrative on how GGGI outputs have led to tangible impact. For example, GGGI should look to set targets for their new 'Large Project Challenge'	<p>I strongly believe in the inspirational and direction-setting value of stretch targets. For example, when I saw that GGGI would be able to outperform its formal Council-set target on green investments of cumulative USD 600 million (in the Refreshed 2020 Strategy, which itself increased the ambition of this target over the original 2020 Strategy), I drastically increased the ambition of this target to cumulative USD 1,800 million (setting annual targets at USD 500 million for 2018; USD 600 million for 2019 and USD700 million for 2020).</p> <p>While we did not quite reach the stretch annual targets in 2018, 2019 and 2020, we did ramp up the investment work and deliver over USD 2 billion, far outperforming the target in the Refreshed Strategy 2020. To me this is not under-performance, but rather the ambitious development of this important new and still evolving GGGI function, now documented in the report <b>Review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts</b> (see item 8). It has also led to the new target of mobilizing USD 16 billion in green investments by 2030. That is also definitely also a stretch target.</p> <p>Our investment project pipeline is mostly developed "bottom-up" through demand from members and opportunities that our country teams originate and respond to. Continuous monitoring of the evolving pipeline by the MT, and the development of the regional strategies in 2021, led the MT to conclude the same imbalances in our investment portfolio as noted by several</p>

		<p>members in questions below: the projects in the pipeline tend to be too small and there is a regional imbalance.</p> <p>Therefore, I launched the Large Project Challenge to focus the energy and attention of GGGI’s teams on engaging our member countries and partners to identify and originate such larger projects, to be able to reach the targets set in Strategy 2030 (and the evolving Regional Strategies). In short, no new targets need to be set for the Large Project Challenge as the nature of this action is to correct an imbalance in our portfolio, in an effort to achieve the stretch targets already set in Strategy 2030.</p> <p>We agree we continuously need to strengthen the narrative on how GGGI outputs lead to tangible impacts. The longer term “culture change” effort is the shift from focusing on intermediary outcomes (policies implemented and money mobilized) to Strategic Outcomes. Building the capacity and knowledge base - in GGGI and our member and partner countries - to assess our outcomes credibly in terms of Strategic Outcomes is the overarching framework that has gradually been embedded in all our work: Strategy, Workplan and Budget, Country Planning Frameworks, Country Business plans, project proposals, and projects results monitoring. This year, 2021, is the first year in which country programs will formally report results against Strategic Outcomes – an effort that was piloted in our reporting over 2020. Please note this is a major effort that affects everything we do. GGGI believes this is necessary to continue to respond to the demands of our funders, as your questions demonstrate, but also that we are well in the frontline of development organizations in the implementation of this results-based management approach.</p>
	<p>7. The FCDO supports GGGI’s focus on greening the recovery to covid-19 and the push to develop more ambitious NDCs. GGGI should continue to explore opportunities to take a central position in the global</p>	<p>GGGI’s primary focus, and predominant allocation of budget, is towards direct action at the country level – as per strong guidance provided by GGGI’s Council and MPSC on multiple occasions.</p>

	<p>debate around environmentally sustainable and climate compatible growth, establishing itself as a global thought leader influencing global policy on the building back better agenda. GGGI should build political support and increase advocacy for green growth and the green recovery agenda amongst influential leaders, using its project examples and networks to do so. This should also include better tracking of what their ‘partnership brokering’ actually looks like in practice. We would suggest GGGI do this in tandem with their existing focus on programming and financing, using outputs to influence global debate.</p>	<p>GGGI maintains a small budget and relatively limited activities related to thought leadership, knowledge management and publications with two key objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Development and maintenance of key tools / models that can be directly used in our country work, primarily the Green Growth Index and Simulation tool, a Green Economy macro-economic model and models and databases related to green employment.</li> <li>2. Learning lessons from country work that contribute to scaling up and out such work and sharing lessons across countries. This includes our active partnering in the Green Growth Knowledge Partnership with UNEP, OECD and World Bank, and a limited number of strategic publications (technical reports, guidelines and policy briefs).</li> </ol> <p>While we do contribute to the global debate through active engagement in key fora such as international conferences, the UNGA or COP, this is a relatively modest function compared to other organizations that focus a large share of their resources on positioning themselves as global thought leaders (such as IEA, IRENA or WRI) - but do not have an embedded country presence such as GGGI.</p> <p>GGGI’s primary efforts to build political support and strong advocacy for green growth and green recovery is at the national level where our country programs organize a large volume of influential events, workshops and capacity building activities – as documented in our weekly newsletters. We acknowledge that this national level work does not translate easily to the global stage, but believe that a change in this strategy would require a significant re-allocation of GGGI’s resources. If the MPSC and our Council have an interest to discuss the relative priority of these activities, along with commensurate budgeting, then we are ready to engage in such a discussion.</p>
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	<p>8. The FCDO agrees that green employment opportunities are critical to convincing partner governments of the need for low carbon development pathways. We would encourage GGGI to deepen thinking around both the quality and skills levels of employment being generated as well as any spatial/temporal disconnect between job creation and destruction.</p>	<p>Indeed, we agree that the quality of the jobs matters and we incorporate these important issues both our analysis of jobs and support we provide to our members and partners.</p> <p>Specifically on skills requirements for the green energy transition, GGGI has incorporated human resources and skills needs assessment issues in its flagship publication on assessing the employment generation of renewable energy in Mexico, Indonesia and Rwanda<sup>1</sup>. In this report GGGI has also addressed and assessed the spatial distribution of renewable energy jobs for Mexico looking also on any potential discrepancies between supply and demand of human resources. Lastly, temporal issues were also addressed illustrating when exactly the jobs would be generated under different electricity generation scenarios. GGGI’s green jobs work continues investigating issues related to spatial/temporal/skills/sectoral misalignments and support our members and partners to achieve a green and just transition.</p> <p>In addition, SO2 on # of green jobs created is as observed a quantitative measure and proxy for economic growth and socio-economic co-benefits, which aligns with macro-economic indicators applied by our members and partners. While a quantitative measure is useful, we also seek opportunities to leverage “decent jobs” and “just transitions”.</p> <p>Labor rights, health and safety is included in GGGI’s Sustainability and Safeguards framework. As such the issue – including child labor – is incorporated into mandatory Preliminary Gender and Social Inclusion Assessment and ESS Screening in PCM2 and PCM3, with the aim to identify both safeguard risks and opportunities to maximize positive impacts on jobs creation and labor conditions. As examples, work in Lao PDR has considered issues of informality</p>
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<sup>1</sup> [https://gsgi.org/site/assets/uploads/2020/06/Employment-Assessment-of-Renewable-Energy\\_Doublespread\\_final.pdf](https://gsgi.org/site/assets/uploads/2020/06/Employment-Assessment-of-Renewable-Energy_Doublespread_final.pdf)

		<p>in the waste sector and included informal actors in project consultations. In Cambodia’s EU SWITCH Asia project, GGGI is including Energy Efficient solutions in the garment industry, which also has the potential to improve working conditions, health, and welfare of factory workers.</p> <p>Labor conditions, modern slavery and child labor are also aspects included in GGGI’s Due Diligence screening for Private Sector partners under the Rule on Private Sector Engagement, and it is part of the UN Code of Conduct for Suppliers embedded in GGGI’s Procurement policy.</p> <p>We wish to add also that women’s economic empowerment as a central part of GGGI’s Gender Equality work is also linked to employment opportunities. At Global Green Growth Week 2019, GGGI organized a Green Jobs side event, which focused on jobs assessments, social co-benefits and gender aspects of RE transitions. IRENA presented their work on “A Gender Perspective”, which inspired GGGI to focus on gender and women empowerment aspects documented in the report <a href="#">“Tracking Increase in Women’s Employment in the RE Sector under NDC Targets”</a>. In Mexico GGGI is a member of a national Women in RE Network (REDMERE) and GGGI carried out government capacity building on Women in Green Growth (with a RE focus). Currently, the Gender aspect in employment is incorporated into work on Green and Resilient Recovery with recognition that women have been impacted disproportionately by the pandemic.</p> <p>We thank you for highlighting this issue – an area we intend to further develop going forward.</p>
Norway	9. We acknowledge the completion of GGGI’s first Strategy for 2015-2020, and the accomplishment of exceeding by a wide margin on all targets set. The DG’s ambition of raising the bar for the new Strategy 2030 is	Thank you.

	supported.	
	10. Raising the bar and scaling up seem timely. However, not without care and consideration. Solid risk assessments, cost efficiency and quality rather than quantity should be guiding principles for decisions on targets and ambitions.	Agreed.
	11. The visions and actions presented in DG's report outline the need for advancing the green growth agenda. Nevertheless, GGGI cannot achieve this alone. We would therefore appreciate reporting on strategic partnership with other organizations or initiatives working towards the same agenda. Through strategic partnerships the possibility to leverage and amplify GGGI's achievements is even stronger, and we would like to learn more about what GGGI do in collaboration with international partners.	<p>Agreed. We agree to initiate more explicit reporting on strategic partnerships going forward in our Annual Report and possibly as a separate report as well. We will consider and make a proposal to Council in October this year to initiate such reporting over 2021 activities.</p> <p>As a short update: GGGI has had strategic knowledge partners from the beginning, UNEP particularly, WB and OECD, plus a large number of organizations that have joined GGKP. For specific knowledge products (GG Index and green employment work) GGGI has established expert advisory groups with representatives from partners.</p> <p>For country programming, GGGI has strategic partnerships of a global nature with GCF (30+ countries), the NDC Partnership, P4G and IIED (for climate diplomacy). With some international organizations, such as GIZ, GGGI partners in multiple countries.</p> <p>For GGGI's work as a whole, though, the large majority of GGGI's partnerships are through a very large number of national and local (and sometimes international) organizations our country programs partner with to implement projects, as projects are rarely implemented by GGGI alone.</p>
	12. GGGI Large Project Challenge is a new initiative presented by the DG. Will this be launched at country level or at regional or global scale? Are these large projects applicable for all the programmatic solutions, or which thematic area will be prioritized? On what	As noted above, the Large Project Challenge is primarily a corrective action to rebalance the GGGI investment project pipeline towards a larger size and better regional distribution. The Large Project Challenge does not create any separate or new processes. It uses the standard form for Project Idea Notes and the

	terms will a large project be launched?	projects initiated through the Large Project Challenge will become part and parcel of the normal GGGI programming. The funding allocated through the Large Project Challenge are both the regular resources approved by Council through WPB 2021-22 and additional resources expected to become available through the Korea Green New Deal Trust Fund.
Denmark	13. From Denmark's side, we acknowledge the progress report's strong focus on reaching climate neutrality (would be good to include other GHGs). We also acknowledge that a core priority should be emissions reductions. Yet, we would encourage a greater focus on nature based solutions, climate adaptation and general sustainability in the progress report. First, we think a slightly wider focus would better reflect the work of the GGGI, and second, the GGGI can play an important role in evening out the financial imbalance between mitigation and adaptation, although co-benefits can make the distinction harder to make.	<p>Thank you. We take climate / carbon neutrality / NetZero2050 to address CO2 equivalents, thus including other GHGs.</p> <p>The DG progress report is just a snapshot of some key issues I wanted to highlight and NetZero 2050, together with aligned NDC commitments of 45-50% before COP26 is in my view the top issue for 2021.</p> <p>That said, I agree the overall breadth of GGGI's work is not well reflected in the DG progress report, but hopefully you find that better represented in the Annual Report and all other documents submitted to MPSC.</p> <p>Finally, we do agree that adaptation is relatively under-represented in GGGI's work – as became clear from our new SO-reporting – and we have initiated steps to address this imbalance.</p>
Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)	14. DG's Progress Report is clear and succinct.	Thank you.

<b>2. Results Report 2020</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
Republic of Korea	15. We welcome that GGGI has exceeded its ambitions despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2020 Results Report gives us a clear picture of the achievements that GGGI has made in 2020. To further enhance our understanding on the	In line with best practice, GGGI defines Attributed impact outcomes as the impacts resulting from GGGI's activities that have direct causal links to the Strategic Outcomes (SOs). GGGI interventions that have direct causal links to the SOs include primarily the development of bankable projects for which GGGI has received

	<p>report, we would like to ask GGGI to expand on the meanings of "attribution" and "contribution" and their difference. It would also be helpful if GGGI to share the definitions and meanings of key indicators of Table 3 on page 16.</p>	<p>investor commitment, the design and implementation of National Financing Vehicles (NFVs) for the mobilization and disbursement of green investments, etc.</p> <p>For Contributed impact outcomes, GGGI defines them as resulting from contributions that GGGI makes towards achieving its member and partner countries' NDC and SDG targets, in areas where GGGI has had sufficiently strong engagement to justify including this impact as something GGGI contributed to (but where attribution to GGGI is rarely possible). The most important example of "contributed outcomes" relate to GGGI's policy work, where impacts may be important and influential, but normally cannot be attributed to GGGI's actions alone, as the changes involve the actions of many other stakeholders.</p> <p>More details of on this topic of attribution and contribution can be found on page 18 in the GGGI SO Technical guideline (<a href="#">Link</a>). We note that GGGI's use of attributed and contributed outcomes is in line with best practice followed by other development partners and guidance from the impact evaluation literature and experts.</p> <p>Definitions of key indicators in Table 3 can be found in the guideline and descriptions section of the CRF 2019-2020 in Annex 1 of the 2020 Annual Results Report.</p>
	<p>16. Taking note of the fact that the number of green growth policies adopted by some countries is relatively high on page 15, please share with us whether there is a specific context or reason behind these figures.</p>	<p>In terms of green growth policies adopted by governments, the numbers were relatively high for some countries such as Indonesia and Colombia because they have relatively bigger programs that involved a lot of green growth policy work that were adopted by their governments. Also in 2020, we came to the end of the WPB 2019-2020 biennium when a high number of the biennium projects got completed enabling a high number of policy assignments completed and green growth policies adopted. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Cambodia and PNG and the Caribbean/OECS also achieved a fairly high number of adopted policies.</p>

		In general, we believe that the observed increase in production of both policy advisory assignments and policies adopted is a trend aligned with the growth in experience, size and maturity of GGGI country programs. We have therefore stretched our targets.
	17. We would like to see a sample of the scorecard (or the scale being used) mentioned on page 17.	The description of the scorecards criteria can be found in the guidance and description section of the CRF 2019-2020 in Annex 1 of the 2020 Annual Results Report.
	18. It is very encouraging to see that GGGI has become one of GCF's major Readiness delivery partners. As the regional office of CTCN is planned to open this year in Songdo, we hope that GGGI will continue to strengthen partnerships between green institutions in Korea and abroad.	Agreed.
	19. As the Korean government is also keen to collaborate with developing countries pursuing green transition, please provide us with more detailed outline of the 13 green recovery projects mentioned on page 25. This may be an opportunity to align our Green New Deal policy with key bilateral partners.	<p>In the Strategy 2030 Addendum paper, more details are provided on these initiatives on pages 11 to 13.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 out of 13 projects focus on estimating the potential of green jobs generation and/or co-benefits in selected economic sectors (i.e. Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Mongolia, Hungary)</li> <li>• 5 out of 13 projects focus on developing sector-specific recovery plans (i.e. Rwanda- Affordable Housing, OECS – Blue Economy, Senegal – Sust. Landscapes, Lao PDR -Sust. Transport, Fiji- Eco-Tourism)</li> <li>• 3 out of 13 projects are or linking green recovery to national development plans or strategies (Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Uganda).</li> </ul> <p>In addition to these 13 small projects funded out of GGGI core resources in late 2020 (using primarily the UK FCDO core resources approved in late 2020), GGGI has also been successful in attracting earmarked resources from QFFD and UK-PACT for a further 8 green recovery projects (in Pacific, Caribbean, Kiribati, Senegal, Peru, Colombia and Mexico) for a total of about \$15 million that have started in 2020-21. Additional earmarked green recovery project</p>

		<p>proposals, provisionally approved but not yet finally committed, are in the pipeline for KOICA (Nepal), Korean-MAFRA (Senegal), expected to start in 2022. Further projects have been developed that focus on green recovery and have been submitted to donors in GGGI's RM pipeline.</p> <p>Additionally, GGGI will assess the Greenness of Recovery of selected member countries using the Greenness of Stimulus Index developed by Vivid Economics in a joint project starting in July 2021. This assessment is expected to provide recommendations for green recovery priorities in GGGI members and will potentially lead to the identification of bankable green recovery opportunities.</p>
United Kingdom	<p>20. FCDO strongly supports GGGI's adoption of an impact pathway approach to monitor progress for all programs. Where possible the approach should be backdated to allow better tracking of GGGI's performance across the two incomparable results frameworks. GGGI should place greater emphasis on the list of 2020 outcomes in table 1, constructing infographics to replace the outdated monitoring on page 5.</p>	<p>This suggestion is well noted. The annual results report format and infographics will be changed for 2021 to coincide with the implementation of the new Strategy 2030 and new CRF 2021-2025 in 2021.</p> <p>The impact pathway approach was initially developed through GGGI's Impact and Evaluation Unit (IEU) to establish a baseline Theory of Change at country program level for country evaluations. That means the impact pathway was intentionally retrospective (encompassing all activities to date) as well as forward looking (as guidance for new programming).</p>
	<p>21. Beyond adequate supply of ecosystem services GGGI should consider incorporating a strategic outcome which captures the need to consider nature/environmental outcomes. Against which nature-based solutions, circular economy and other types of interventions can be measured for reducing natural resource extraction, exploitation of nature and improving material efficiency.</p>	<p>This is noted. Maintaining the capacity of ecosystems to provide ecosystems services is intended as a proxy indicator for overall ecosystems health, or maintaining natural capital (SO5). While not easy to measure, the capacity of ecosystems to maintain their essential functions, taken as their ability to provide ecosystem services, is an analytical framework against which nature-based solutions, circular economy and other types of interventions can be measured, in theory. In practice, the use of the number of hectares of natural systems that are considered to be "protected" or "improved" is an admittedly simplistic indicator. We will actively follow, and engage in, the discussion on nature-based solutions and</p>

		<p>circular economy to see which improved indicators emerge that we can adopt.</p> <p>We note that other, equally proximate, indicators that we use that also relate to circular economy and nature-based solutions are SO3, access to sustainable services (including waste management) and SO6, enhanced climate change adaptation (including through nature-based solutions).</p> <p>While we aim to keep the number of global reporting targets and indicators limited (to 6 SOs), we can, and do, use many more detailed indicators at project level, as well as in our Green Growth Index and Simulation Tool work.</p>
	<p>22. Why is there a 2-year delay for all countries to report against the new strategic outcomes?</p>	<p>Actually, the planned reporting is not a 2-year delay. In 2019 we introduced SO targets at the organizational level in the New Strategy 2030, that takes effect in 2021. To prepare for Strategy 2030 implementation (that started in January 2021), we developed a plan to roll out in 2020 the SO targets at country level and we included the approach in the new CRF, with the plan to start using this new approach for results reporting in the WPB 2021-22 which is the first period we report in this new way. Therefore, 2020 was a year of early roll-out through piloting of SO reporting. In 2022 when we report the results over 2021, that will be the first year to do the SO reporting as planned. Therefore, there is no delay in reporting on the SOs.</p>
	<p>23. The FCDO congratulates GGGI on their ability to increase funding this year despite the substantial challenges of Covid-19. With regards to the pipeline of green investments (valued at 1.05 billion) how confident are GGGI this will be realized?</p>	<p>Thank you.</p> <p>The valuation of the pipeline does include the use of likelihood of achievement factors depending on the development stage of the project. The pipeline value is therefore our best estimate of the volume of green investments that will be realized at this point in time.</p> <p>We must acknowledge, though, that development of bankable</p>

	<p>projects is a high-risk activity where many things that GGGI has no influence over can, and will, go wrong. Despite our best efforts, or even strong performance in some cases, some projects will still fall through, or be delayed, due to changing priorities of governments or investors, elections, or conflicts.</p> <p>We mitigate against these risks by having a full portfolio, by adjusting or re-prioritizing in a nimble and agile manner and accepting that we cannot achieve a 100% success rate.</p>
<p>24. In table 1 why are outcomes from 2017-2020 cumulative rather than disaggregated by year? Given GGGI had already surpassed their cumulative 2022 target for SO 1,5 and 6 by the end of 2020 and with many 2020 results more than double that of 2020 targets (table 3) GGGI should work with key stakeholders to adopt progressively stretching targets. Where GGGI did underperform against 2020 targets e.g. Outcome 2.1 Total volume of green investment catalyzed with GGGI's support, by public and private sources, it would be useful to understand why this is the case and steps GGGI are taking in 2021 to ensure they meet this target. Of the funding catalyzed by GGGI the majority (USD 272m of 476m) was dedicated to two projects, are GGGI actively pursuing large scale projects supplemented by smaller projects?</p>	<p>Since it was the first time that SO impact reporting was done, the new Country Program Results Report (CPRR) format was kept simple to report on the 2020 SO impact results and the 2017-2019 cumulative results separately. Table 1 presents the 2020 results and the 2017-2020 (2017-2019 + 2020) cumulative results.</p> <p>The reason why we went back to 2017 is to be consistent with 2030 SO impact targets in Strategy 2030 which were set using the 2017 results as the baseline.</p> <p>GGGI achieved strong results in 2020 that exceeded targets because it was the second year of the biennium WPB 2019-2020 when most its projects got completed. The CRF 2019-2020 targets were set in 2018 but GGGI has since increased the number of its projects to nearly 150.</p> <p>As explained above (response to Item 1, Question 6) the volume of green investments was a stretch target set by management when we discovered it was possible to outperform the formal target set in Refreshed Strategy 2020. It is therefore a good example of the organization adopting progressively stretching targets.</p> <p>It is true that we have not seen a strong organic increase in the volume of green investments mobilized in the last several years, and some imbalances over regions as well. Other than regular</p>

		<p>monitoring and continuous feedback to teams, the primary action management has taken in 2021 to ensure the target will be met in coming years is the Large Project Challenge mentioned in the DG's Progress Report.</p> <p>It is also true that to date the investment mobilized has been characterized by one or two very large projects and a number of smaller deals. As can be seen, to reach a significant volume of investment mobilized it is important to increase the number of viable large projects (greater than \$50 million), while on the other hand, for small countries or new markets small projects are the natural starting point. GGGI therefore has operated with 2 complementary investment targets related to: (a) total volume of finance mobilized; and (b) number of projects for which initial investor commitment was achieved.</p>
	<p>25. As described by figure 5, it is interesting to see so many projects are aligned with SO1 (reduced emissions) but so few against SO 4 (improved air quality) are these two SOs not intrinsically linked? It is also interesting to see the majority of GGGI's programmatic effort focused on mitigation as opposed to adaptation (SO 1, 2, 3 and 4 are mitigation focused) GGGI should explore new opportunities to reduce a country's vulnerability to climate change, this is particularly pertinent in the global south where emissions levels are limited and capacity to adapt to climate change is low. Establishing a stronger narrative on the link between adaptation and green growth.</p>	<p>Agreed, SO1 and SO4 are intrinsically linked, though not identical. While GGGI introduced indicators and a methodology for SO1 in 2018 – which has been gradually introduced and is now widely adopted throughout the organization – we were initially unable to come up with a viable and practical indicator for SO4, and therefore there has been no reporting to date against this indicator.</p> <p>We have since developed a practical methodology and indicators which will use PM2.5 emissions for attributed outcomes, and average annual PM2.5 concentrations in major cities (as reported in the World Air Quality Report) for contributed outcomes. This new methodology is rolled out in 2021 and we expect to see many more projects report against this indicator going forward.</p> <p>Also agreed that we have an imbalance in our portfolio that underemphasizes adaptation (as became clear from the pilot reporting over 2020), we have therefore initiated action to broaden our support for climate adaptation, particularly for SIDS and LDCs.</p>

		<p>Adaptation focusses and adaptation co-benefits are gaining more attention internally. For the first time, a separate event on Adaptation was held at the March 2021 GGGI Annual Meeting and the CAID Unit has subsequently started a mapping of GGGI’s Adaptation initiatives (a brochure to be finalized by Q3). This mapping is a start towards strengthening GGGI’s adaptation approaches, and to build a stronger narrative around our adaptation work to date. CAID is also developing a systematic approach to incorporate “climate resilience” into LT-LEDS in recognition that our LT-LEDS-related services are often undertaken in countries where adaptation is a high priority. A methodology - which builds on experiences on Fiji LEDES and Tonga LEDES and – could be tested in Vanuatu, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia with AFD funding.</p> <p>Indeed, a stronger focus on adaptation will resonate well particularly with LDC and SIDS members and partners priorities and complements well the work undertaken under our Climate Diplomacy Program, which includes the LDC Initiative for Enhanced Resilience and Adaptation (LIFE-AR) and UNDP-EU Progressive Platform for Climate Action.</p>
	<p>26. The FCDO welcomes GGGI’s continued focus on mainstreaming gender issues in the climate debate and would encourage GGGI to report on performance against gender targets in all relevant outputs, such as the GGGI Annual Report. We would encourage GGGI to further strengthen the application of gender equality and mainstreaming indicators within all of their projects, over just the minimum standard of gender disaggregated indicators. It is great to see the adoption of regional Gender Focal Points too and would encourage this network to share best practice and lessons with other GGGI regional teams and project</p>	<p>This is well noted. Gender mainstreaming is work in progress and GGGI is working to strengthen the inclusion of quality gender design features with quality targets and indicators in its targeted gender mainstreaming projects, collect relevant gender disaggregated data and report on project performance and results, and build gender awareness and capacity across the organization.</p> <p>As noted, we are working to strengthen the application of gender and poverty markers on projects in PCM2 and PCM3, and to sex disaggregate “number people benefitting” from GGGI activities against Corporate Results Framework indicators and SOs. Next, we recognize the need to enhance capacity for project level social</p>

	managers to further embed a gender sensitive approach.	<p>indicators. A training on this was rolled on late May with the launch of a GESI Handbook and an instructional video. This focus on capacity building is aligned with the GESI Action Plan 2021-2022 presented in an Annex to the new Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy. In Q3 and Q4 2021, also in line with the GESI Action Plan, we will indeed focus on collecting best practices and lessons learned.</p> <p>GGGI is also leading the start-up of a Gender Expert Group as part of the Green Growth Knowledge Partnership, GGKP (with our other leading international partners, UNEP, OECD, WB and many others), and will by June 2022 have completed a knowledge gaps assessment in consortium with our GGKP partners.</p>
	27. In table 7, of budget allocated to MICs do GGGI have a breakdown of funding directed to UMICs vs LMICs? How much of earmarked funding has been dedicated to LDCs/MICs compared to core funding?	<p>The commitment for budget allocation follows the targets in the CRF 2019-2020 set by Council. Targets have been added on and revised in the new CRF 2021-2025.</p> <p>We have not yet broken-down MIC allocated core funding into UMIC and LMIC buckets but can report on this going forward.</p> <p>We have also not yet assessed the total earmarked funding flowing to countries in the different income groups but can likewise report on this going forward.</p>
Norway	28. Overall, the achievement of results in relation to strategic goals and performance targets as stated in the results framework is good. GGGI reports that they have, in most cases, exceeded the 2020 targets.	Thank you.
	29. The report does not include any information on whether any evaluations have been conducted and if relevant, what major findings and learning have resulted from these. Also, there is no reporting on risks included in the report, apart from the section on Covid-19. It is important that GGGI regularly and systematically revisits and updates their risk analysis,	The comment on the exclusion of evaluations and risks in the 2020 Results Report is well noted and will be covered in future reports going forward. GGGI has a 6-monthly risk management reporting to MPSC and the Council, covering all the risk categories relevant to the organization. These reports are used by management to adapt to emerging risks immediately, as was the case during the COVID pandemic in 2020.

	<p>and not only reacts to risks that materialize. Reporting on risk management should be part of either the annual report or results report.</p>	<p>The evaluations undertaken in 2020 by Impact and Evaluation Unit (IEU) included the Vietnam country program Impact Pathway Review (IPR). The Vietnam IPR and learnings from it formed the basis for effectively rolling out the end-of-year CPRR (Country Program Results Report) to report on ex-ante impacts of GGGI’s program interventions by country programs. Transitioning to CPPR is an important shift in how GGGI would be measuring and monitoring yearly progress towards Strategy 2030 (expected impact) targets. Drawing on the lessons learned from the Vietnam and previous IPRs, IEU were able to provide effective review and guidance to the country program teams in preparing the CPPRs by working closely with the Strategy Unit. The lessons learned from the IPR and CPRR processes will be used in further refining the process of monitoring and reporting of impacts and related capacity development across the organization. The learnings will also be used by the IEU to further strengthen upcoming country and thematic evaluations and to provide practical guidance around monitoring and reporting plans in large, earmarked projects for alignment to GGGI’s impact agenda.</p> <p>The Strategy Unit of ODG also prepared a review of the 2019 results report exercise – lessons learned - with recommendations which have been implemented to improve programs/projects delivery and results reporting. An example is the review and adoption of a simplified Country Planning Framework (CPF) guideline in 2020 which sharpens the focus on setting country program priorities that align with Strategy 2030 and national policy agendas and setting impact targets using the country impact pathway tool. The findings from this review also guided the review of the Project Idea Note (PIN) project proposal template in 2021 and supported the development of the new PCM 1 Manual which outlines GGGI’s strategic framework and integration with PCMs 2-5 as well as strengthening monthly and quarterly project monitoring</p>
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		<p>and quality project log frame development. Additional capacity building through Results Based Management training was also carried out to strengthen project monitoring and results reporting.</p> <p>GGGI undertook a performance review of the achievements of Strategy 2015-2020 against key targets and this report prepared by the Impact and Evaluation Unit (IEU) in OED is part of the session papers tabled to this session of the MPSC. A focus of the report is on the lessons learned to improve future programs/projects and business processes and systems.</p> <p>In terms of risk assessment, GGGI has used lessons learned from its previous results reports to strengthen its quarterly projects monitoring mechanism with the adoption of a traffic light system that identifies projects in the red for Management intervention and guidance to improve their performance. The quarterly progress report is compiled and tabled to Management at the end of every quarter by GGPI.</p>
	<p>30. The report includes results for strategic outcomes (SO) ex-ante impacts. These results are presented as “consolidated SO attribution and contribution ex-ante impact achieved through GGGI’s programs and projects in 2020 as well as for the period 2017 to 2020.” The results presented for each SO are based on percent of projects that are aligned to that SO and what results can be attributed to this SO. The report shows that there is progress for several of the SOs, some have also exceeded the target set for 2022. Even though the methodology and results presented are well explained, it is important to note that what is presented here are ex-ante results, which would mean that they are “projections” rather than actual results that have happened. It is good to see that GGGI are on track for several of the SOs compared to the targets set for 2022</p>	<p>Agreed, what we count as GGGI’s achievements, such as policies adopted, or investment commitments mobilized, are generally still ex-ante estimates of impacts, which will only be realized when policies are implemented, investment projects have been implemented etc.</p> <p>Only in rare cases is GGGI involved in project implementation (such as the installation of solar water systems in Vanuatu), but in most cases our work is relatively upstream.</p> <p>Going forward GGGI could consider changing the language from “achieved impacts” to “projected impacts”.</p>

	<p>and the final targets set for 2030, however, it is important to bear in mind that not all of these are actual results that have been achieved yet.</p>	
	<p>31. The only “underperforming” objective is “Better value for money - maximizing institutional effectiveness and efficiency” where several of the output targets were not met. Can you please explain why the target was not met for this objective?</p>	<p>There are seven targets under this objective. Four of the targets were met. These are: Output 7.1: % of core budget spent on non-programmatic activity. Output 7.4: % of core budget allocated to LDCs and MICs combined. Output 7.6: Effective and timely communication of results; and Output 7.7: Increase in GGGI core and earmarked funding.</p> <p>The most important measure of institutional efficiency – and value for money - is the % of total budget spend on non-programmatic activities (i.e. overhead rate). The lower the % the more efficient the organization is. The goal is to reduce spending as far as possible below the target. Overhead at GGGI has come down rapidly from 31% in 2015.</p> <p><b>Output 7.1: % of core budget spent on non-programmatic activity. Target of 30%; Achieved 16%.</b> GGGI’s overhead rate decreased to 16% in 2020 from 20% in 2019 and 22% in 2018. The target of 30% was set at the beginning of the 2015-2020 strategy period and has been far outperformed. In 2018 management stretched this target to achieve 15% by 2023, and we are well on track to achieve this stretch target.</p> <p>Of the three outputs not achieved, the following is an explanation:</p> <p><b>Output 7.2 % of budget disbursed. 68% was achieved against a target of 100%.</b> It should be noted that GGGI strives to disburse budget only when it has been confirmed by written agreement from donors. We should not spend money that we do not have. This is in line with sound financial management principles. For this reason, not</p>

		<p>achieving 100% disbursement against budget is not necessarily negative and is not under-performance.</p> <p>In 2020 as previously noted COVID had two negative financial consequences for GGGI. Firstly, there was a reduction in core funding from two of our core donors and secondly there were delays in both the signing of new earmarked projects and the implementation of some earmarked projects. The 2020 budget was reduced downwards during the year to ensure that GGGI did not spend funds it did not have, thereby ensuring the financial sustainability of the organization.</p> <p><b>Output 7.3: % of core budget allocated to LDCs. 48% was achieved against a target of 50%.</b></p> <p><b>Output 7.5: % of core budget allocated to vulnerable countries (UNOHRRLLS definition): 51% was achieved against a target of 60%</b></p> <p>The 2020 operational budget had core funding allocations of 50% and 60% to LDCs and LDCs &amp; SIDS combined, respectively. The sudden reduction in core of \$3.9 million (i.e. UK and Korea) which represented 19% of core funding unfortunately led to cuts that resulted in underperformance on those 2 indicators. It should be noted that we did however focus our immediate efforts on replacing those funds through earmarked resources (projects were developed and approved of \$10 million from QFFD all to vulnerable countries; \$4 million from NZ to SIDS; \$2.8 million Canadian CFAN funding to SIDS).</p> <p>As we see a growing share of GGGI's operations funded out of earmarked projects as well as program restricted funding, with the role of core resources changing, these indicators may need to be reconsidered in future. GGGI will start reporting on the flow of earmarked resources to countries in the different income groups.</p>
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	<p>32. Some of the intermediate outcome indicators are monitored by using a scoring system. It would have improved the reporting if a narrative was included to explain these results rather than just presenting the score results and explaining how the score was set. This does not provide us with actual results information, like what changes a particular score represents. For example, for intermediate outcome 3 the extent to which “GGGI’s capacity building have directly strengthened Members’ and partners’ capacity to develop and implement green growth policies and investments was measured using a balanced scorecard along six criteria with an average score of 7.1 out of a maximum score of 10.” The six criteria are then mentioned; however, we do not get any information on what this means. More analysis and explanation on what a score of 7.1 means in terms of concrete changes/progress would strengthen the report, and we suggest this information to be added to the report.</p>	<p>This is noted. The scorecard scoring system is explained in the guideline and descriptions section of the CRF 2019-2020 in Annex 1 of the 2020 Results Report. The narrative explaining the scores and results was standard practice in previous results reports but was omitted in 2020 to simplify the report with the inclusion of the country scorecards.</p> <p>For example, the scorecard description for Outcome indicator 3.1 is copy pasted below from the CRF 2019-2020:</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>A key purpose of GGGI’s knowledge sharing activities is to build capacity of partner governments and local agents to support the development and implementation of green growth policies and investments. This indicator focuses on capacity building activities that incorporate green growth lessons from other countries, and the extent to which these activities have led to improvement in participants’ knowledge or skills and how they have directly applied it to advancing partner countries green growth agenda. It will measure the extent to which GGGI’s capacity development activities have strengthened partner countries capacity to implement green growth policies and investments, using a 5-point scale balanced scorecard to assess the following questions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. In this project, did GGGI conduct capacity building activities related to green growth and climate change for government counterparts and local development agents (individuals)?</li> <li>ii. In this project, how many government counterparts and other participants, attended the capacity building event? How many were men and how many were women?</li> <li>iii. In this project, have those participants including government counterparts who attended the capacity building event demonstrated a gain in knowledge and skills from their training and learning?</li> </ol> </div>
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		<p>iv. In this project, did government counterparts and other participants use the knowledge gained to implement green growth or climate change policies, budgets or programs?</p> <p>v. In this project, did GGGI's implemented capacity building activities clearly align with the country specific objectives set out in the WPB 2017-2018?</p> <p>If each of these 5 questions are answered with 'yes' we assign a score of 2, 'partially' for a score of 1 or 'no' for a score of 0 with a maximum score of 10 (for 5 questions answered yes).</p>
	<p>33. Specific comments on Peru:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Page 64, could GGGI explain why the status of the project «Agroforestry Concessions (Action)» is «at-risk»?</li> <li>• Page 109, has the document «Analysis of implementation conditions for Agroforestry Concessions in the San Martin region» already been prepared? Could GGGI share it with us?</li> <li>• Page 109, could you share with us the document «Recommendations on the San Martin Regional Government Competitivity Plan»?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This at-risk status is recognition of the seriousness of the COVID epidemic in Peru and its effect on implementation, not that the project itself is at risk. The manner in which GGGI and its consortium partners have adapted to COVID for project implementation may be found in <i>Section 3: Overview of Work Program 2021</i>.</li> <li>• Yes. We will make it available together with these responses and look forward to any questions or comments you may have on its content.</li> <li>• Yes. We will make it available together with these responses and look forward to any questions or comments you may have on its content.</li> </ul>
Denmark	<p>34. We would like to welcome the good and quantifiable result framework of the GGGI. It is indeed welcome. Yet, as GGGI is working in coordination with other IOs, there could be a risk of double counting. As such, it would be good to qualify whether result framework, in particular on finance, is also reported by other actors. As the issue is sensitive in the climate negotiations, the methodology should be watertight and only mobilized finance attributed to the GGGI ought to be highlighted</p>	<p>Thank you. We should indeed have agreement on the methodology and avoid double counting. As we always partner with others on such projects, and in some cases with other development partners such as GIZ, there is indeed some risk of double counting.</p> <p>Where you refer to climate negotiations, and we presume the contributions to the \$100 billion in climate finance, we do not believe there will be double counting as the money mobilized by GGGI will not, or should not, be counted towards the \$100 billion, as we are not the source of the funding. Contributions to the \$100 billion will be counted at the level of the investors providing the funding (be they GCF, countries or private sector investors).</p>

	<p>35. As we move forward, it could likely be good to add a focus on vulnerable groups to the focus on gender mainstreaming.</p>	<p>Noted and agreed. Implementing the new Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy and Action Plan, a key priority is on internal capacity building to better apply gender and poverty markers, which include preliminary GESI assessments on all projects and the clear articulation of project level outcomes and indicators. A training on this subject was rolled out in late May with the internal release of the GESI Handbook and a video tutorial to further strengthen the awareness of GESI-links with programmatic solutions. This important work is in progress.</p>
	<p>36. As we understand it, all support to GGGI is considered ODA. With that, we take note that Hungary is mentioned as a country of intervention? We do acknowledge that the intervention follows a decision from 2017. Yet, it needs to be ensured that all support can be counted as ODA.</p>	<p>Not all support through GGGI is considered ODA. The annual results report tracks and reports on all GGGI's annual programmatic and non-programmatic results and achievements against the key indicators in the relevant CRF. It covers all country programs including high-income countries like Hungary and UAE. We note these are self-financed programs. GGGI reports only all ODA-relevant activities to OECD-DAC. The Hungary country program, for example, is not counted as ODA and is excluded from our annual OECD-DAC Report (except if Hungary chooses to finance ODA activities, such as a Hungary funded project in Uganda in the past). Thus, we ensure that only admissible support is reported and counted as ODA.</p>
<p>Hungary</p>	<p>37. In the Progress and Status of 2018-2019 <i>Green Investments Mobilized</i> table</p> <p>page 119, row 19. The fund was approved in 2018 following Government Decision 1770/2018. [XII. 21.]</p> <p>⇒ the Gov. decision <i>approved</i> the establishment of the Western Balkan Green Center NPlc. (WBGC). The Western Balkan Green Fund has not yet been established.</p> <p>page 120, row 8.</p>	<p>Thank you for these corrections. We will ensure accurate reporting going forward.</p>

	<p>The fund was established and operational, with funding available in 2019.</p> <p>⇒ The <b>WBGC</b> was established and operational with funding available in 2019.</p>	
	<p>38. Further, we would like ask for clarification for the indicated amount of green public investments mobilized in 2018: 4.5M USD and 2019: 6M USD (total: <b>10.5M USD</b>). Please provide clarification on the amounts indicated. (Also appears under item 8)</p>	<p>Thank you for the correction. The actual green investment reported will be adjusted to the Government Decision [1770/2018. [XII. 21.] of 2018 approving a total of USD 6 million (about USD 2 million/year for 2019, 2020 and 2021) as funding for the Western Balkan Green Center NPlc that became operational in 2019.</p>
<p>Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)</p>	<p>39. Results Report seems very comprehensive. Suggest to consider inclusion of key achievement highlights in a separate page.</p>	<p>The 2 page overview prepared for the annual report can be used. (<a href="#">LINK</a>). Also on page 16, 2020 results at a glance page demonstrates 2020 results which highlights key achievements against the CRF 2019-2020.</p>

3. Overview of Work Program 2021		
Member	Questions/Comments	Responses
<p>Cote d'Ivoire</p>	<p>40. As of May 2021, GGGI is working on 141 policy projects and successfully passed 54 green growth policies, a 23% increase over its 2020 target. We note that these projects also extend to non-member countries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under which conditions are these non-member countries eligible for the Institute's programs?</li> <li>• How should new members arrange to be included in the GGGI work program?</li> </ul>	<p>GGGI engages with 2 groups of countries: (a) members; and (b) partner countries that are generally countries that are on the road to membership (as accession of GGGI's treaty often takes a long time).</p> <p>GGGI engages a non-member country with a project specific support (i) after the country formally expresses its intent to become a member, and (ii) a concrete project opportunity through earmarked funding such as GCF readiness is agreed with its government. Such an engagement in the majority of cases leads to membership and subsequently a full country presence.</p> <p>In addition, GGGI engages a limited number of non-member countries if these participate in regional projects as in the cases of Bahrain and Marshall Island, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.</p> <p>Overall, the country programming criteria approved by the Council [<a href="#">C/2019/DC/9</a>] guides the decision to start operations with new</p>

		<p>members.</p> <p>For new members, as in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, GGGI proactively engages with government to identify opportunities to develop and strengthen a country program where possible. Country operations are further enhanced if and when an agreement on privileges and immunities (HCA) can be signed.</p>
	<p>41. The Green Climate Fund and GGGI operate in the same field of activity and are both headquartered in Korea. With such similarities, what is the nature or extent of their collaboration?</p>	<p>GGGI and GCF have established a framework agreement which guides the close collaboration the two institutions have. GGGI helps members build capacities and accelerate access to climate finance including from GCF. The complementarity and synergies between GGGI and GCF have resulted in GGGI support to 29 countries to access GCF funding to date.</p> <p>GGGI considers GCF a key strategic partner and we know that GCF considers GGGI a key delivery partner for its readiness program. In addition, GGGI is one of the few, if not the only, international partner of GCF that has chosen to prioritize Direct Access of its member countries, over accreditation for GGGI itself.</p> <p>GCF and GGGI share the increase of Direct Access in overall GCF programming as a joint strategic objective.</p>
<p>Republic of Korea</p>	<p>42. We take note that GGGI set an ambitious target of projects with increasing focus on green investments. Annex 5 attached in the 20 20 Results Report shows that GGGI is able to mobilize various types of green investments and support the implementation.</p>	<p>Annex 5 presents the progress and status of green investments catalyzed by GGGI since 2017. Our reports indicate that nearly two thirds of the projects have progressed beyond the initial investment commitment stage to secure signed investment agreements or the disbursement stage. This shows that a majority of GGGI's projects are progressing towards implementation after GGGI's exit.</p> <p>GGGI's explicit aim is to mobilize initial commitments from financiers or project developers to invest or take over the responsibility of finding investment for green and climate projects in members and partner countries. GGGI normally makes a</p>

	<p>deliberate “exit” from a specific project at the point where proven initial investment commitment is secured. Proof usually takes the form of letters of intent (LOI) or memorandum of understanding (MOU) or formal correspondence documented by GGGI. Therefore, the reference to mobilizing green investments refers to the mobilization of initial investments commitments.</p>
<p>43. It would be better if the report elaborates on how each stage of the three to four deal cycle mentioned on page 6 works respectively as you did in the Review of Green Investment. Is it correct for us to understand that the difference between the years in Figure 6 is equivalent to the amount of "completed"?</p>	<p>The mentioned three-step-deal-cycle is identical to the project preparation cycle described in the Review of Green Investment Report.</p> <p>GGGI currently has a project pipeline for each year shown in Figure 6. In 2021, the project pipeline size is USD 718 million of which USD 10 million has achieved investor commitment, USD 92 million is in investment-ready/financing stage, USD 559 million is in design stage, and USD 58 million is in concept stage. For 2022, the total investment project pipeline size is USD 576 million, of which USD 50 million is in investment-ready/financing stage, USD 149 million is in design stage, and USD 377 million is in concept stage. The same logic goes for 2023 and 2024. Given that these sizes present the current project pipeline within GGGI, the numbers are expected to grow overtime when more projects enter the project pipeline.</p>
<p>44. Regarding the launching of the new Carbon Pricing Unit mentioned in page 7, we would like to know the work plan of the Unit and whether this will be linked with Art.6 negotiations. If there is a link, what is GGGI's objective in pursuing this work?</p>	<p>The objective of the Carbon Pricing Unit is to help our members and partners put a price on carbon emissions, incentivizing their reduction. This will be done through both policy planning and support; the design and structuring of Art 6 carbon transactions and knowledge sharing.</p> <p>Further details can be found on Page 19 and 20 of the Strategy 2030 addendum (Part 1) – Item 5 of the MPSC pack. The workplan of the unit is not directly linked to the negotiations of Article 6 but as work develops under all the programs findings will be fed back to the donors who may choose to use these to inform the negotiations.</p>

United Kingdom	<p>45. GGGI’s delivery of 219 advisory output is highly impressive, we encourage GGGI to explore how such knowledge products can be shared as public goods. GGGI may wish to keep track of how their outputs are used in the wider evidence base tracking number of downloads of reports and number of citations. It would also be useful to understand the definition of ‘adopted’ does this imply 54 of GGGI’s green growth policies have been implemented by partner governments?</p>	<p>GGGI delivered 119 green growth policy advisory outputs in 2020 and these are in addition to our knowledge products. Policy advisory assignments are bespoke products developed for our member governments. They are only put in the public domain with approval of our member governments.</p> <p>In terms of knowledge products, GGGI delivered 155 in 2020 and these are indeed public goods. The suggestion to track their use is noted. “Adopted policies’ means policies developed and delivered with GGGI’s support were adopted (as policies) or approved (as e.g. NDC targets) by the governments. The commitment, resourcing and implementation of these adopted policies by our governments is the next step.</p>
	<p>46. Table 2 outlines the breakdown of programs across GOPs – it is interesting to see the limited number of workstreams which sit under GOP 3. Are GGGI exploring opportunities to explore new opportunities in this area and to rebalance the portfolio across all GOPs? Does limited work in this area reflect limited demand from partner governments?</p>	<p>The limited work area under GOP3 of “Achieving a sustainable and circular bioeconomy while securing healthy natural systems” reflects limited demand at the time from partner governments, in part due to limited capacity in GGGI, and also where many other organizations are already working.</p> <p>Note that GOP3 is focusing on bioeconomy and natural systems. The definition includes the word “circular”, as in circular economy now often used, in Europe particularly, but GGGI’s work most linked to circular economy is waste management work, which is both large and pervasive. Thus, some of the allocations are a matter of definition.</p> <p>While working towards post-Covid 19 recovery, some of the programmatic solutions under GOP3 such as climate smart agriculture are high in demand from GGGI member and partner countries, as a solution for food security, livelihood improvement and green job creation including agri-entrepreneur opportunities to address Covid-19 related economic impacts. As part of the green recovery support, GGGI is expanding climate smart agriculture in the next few years.</p>

		<p>Climate smart agriculture was barely present in GGGI’s portfolio to date, but through proposals developed over the last several years, we have now started CSA projects in Kiribati, Uganda, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, we have also recruited staff with this expertise, and in line with this growing capacity in GGGI, we expect this portfolio to grow rapidly.</p>
	<p>47. GGGI’s portfolio of projects for 2021 are on average smaller than those in 2020 with more projects at a lower value. Does this represent a shift in GGGI’s approach to catalyzing funding? Why is there such a shift in the profile of investments from 2020 to 2021? With regards to the regional distribution outlined in figure 3, how does this compare to previous years? Why is there such a large difference in the profile of advisory outputs vs investment pipeline and how does this align with GGGI’s geographic priorities?</p>	<p>For 2020, as the end of the biennium 2019-20 work program implementation, sizeable investment results in Asia are derived from India(145M), Indonesia (127M), Vietnam (30M) and Mongolia (27M). For 2021-22, as of now, investment projects are being originated and project pipelines are further being developed. As a consequence, some of our early projects are not at a scalable stage. With additional efforts by the Secretariat to strengthen the pipeline with “Large Project Challenge” to solicit and award scalable investment projects bigger than USD 50M, we expect by the end of this 2021-22 work program cycle, we can significantly strengthen the investment results than what is reported in the 2021 pipeline.</p> <p>The regional distribution of investment pipeline in 2021 in Figure 3 shows strong growth of investment projects from Latin America and Caribbean. For the previous year, Asia delivered 82% of the total investment mobilized at 476M, followed by Latin America with 10% and Pacific 7%. This reflects in part the setting up a regional office in LAC and placing regional investment leads in the region that have been effective to drive forward results on the ground.</p> <p>For the policy outputs where Asia and Africa have larger pipelines, this reflects larger number of countries in the regional groups while investment number reflects market sizes of a project in a country where MICs tend to have larger potential. Across all regions, both policy outputs as crucial enabler of green investment, and green</p>

	<p>48. The FCDO strongly supports GGGI’s work on delivering more ambitious NDCs and encourage GGGI to track the scale of influence they achieve i.e. expected level of tCO2eq avoided due to upgrading of NDC commitments. We understand GGGI may already do this as a part of their broader results framework, but a breakdown of results achieved by product/service type would be useful to understand where GGGI is achieving most impact.</p>	<p>investment mobilization to implement NDCs and Low Emissions Pathways are equally emphasized and pursued.</p> <p>Specifically, on “scale of influence” linked to the NDC Enhancement work described in more detail under MPSC Agenda Item 7: most of the specific 2020 NDC enhancement work was delivered under the NDC Partnership CAEP Program. GGGI is in dialogue with NDC Partnership on the Evaluation of the CAEP Program, for which NDCP has contracted Vivid Economics. We expect their preliminary results in July. This evaluation is expected to bring light to GGGI’s contributions/attributions to overall NDC enhancement and increased ambitions of members and partners, where GGGI’s technical advisory services formed part of a larger collaboration with development partners.</p> <p>With regard to LT-LEDS, GGGI has supported the government of Hungary to analyze different emission pathways to reach climate neutrality by 2050. Based on GGGI’s analytical support the Government of Hungary opted for an Early Action pathway to achieve its climate neutrality target by maximizing the co-benefits that could be accrued through the decarbonization of its economy. In addition, the selected pathway is compatible with the 55% reduction target by 2030 decided by the European Council in 2020.</p> <p>GGGI has begun tracking and reporting the impact of its programs and projects on each SO including SO1 on GHG reduction. The 2020 Results Report presents in Table 1 (see below) the attribution and contribution impact for GHG reduction under SO1 in 2020 and cumulatively for the period 2017-2020. While this is not disaggregated by sector, the sector sources can be seen in the Country Program Results Reports (CPRRs) links in the 2020 Results Reports.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>2020 and 2017-2020 Strategic Outcome Impacts</b></p>
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		SOs		2017-2020 Cumulative Total		
		2020 Total		Attribution	Contribution	
		Attribution	Contribution	Attribution	Contribution	
		<b>SO1</b>	102 Million tCO2eq	1532 Million tCO2eq	112 Million tCO2eq	1634 Million tCO2eq
	49. The investment project pipeline is strongly focused on Latin America and Caribbean. Are GGGI exploring opportunities to increase the volume of similar projects in Africa and Asia?	Yes, despite strong investment results delivery in Asia in the previous work program cycle, we acknowledge relatively weak investment pipeline in Asia and Africa for 2021-22. In order to incentivize all regions to step up and strengthen investment project pipelines for the 2021-22 work program cycle, GGGI DG launched a “Large Project Challenge” for all country teams to submit Project Idea Notes (PIN) of sizable green investment potential of at least 50 M USD by 15 June 2021. Country offices across all regions are actively consulting the management team with project ideas for submission. GGGI Secretariat will update MPSC on selected projects and their implementation progress during the work program reporting.				
Norway	50. GGGI has done well in reaching strategic goals and performance targets despite the extremely challenging circumstances of 2020. This indicates that the organization is adaptable and responsive to risks and unexpected events. We take note there is an increase in the targets for 2021, and we support this decision based on the over-achievement from previous years.	Thank you.				
	51. It is reassuring to see that risk assessment is actively used as basis for deciding on future pipeline of projects. Although it is good to focus on quantitative targets on green investment commitments, it should not override solid risk management.	Agreed.				
	52. Specific comments on Peru: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2021, GGGI has an ambitious plan for Peru. Nevertheless, the document lacks a thorough analysis of the possible implications of Covid-19 in their activities. <u>According to the latest data</u>, Peru has the</li> </ul>	In 2021, key Norway-financed project activities take place in rural communities to establish pilot activities for agroforestry concession award. In light of this, the project team has adapted to COVID with the following measures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drastically reduce in-country travel from Lima-based staff</li> </ul>				

	<p>highest Covid death rate as a proportion of population in the world. Could you elaborate on how you foresee the activities in Peru will be affected in the coming months?</p>	<p>and contracted locally-based technical staff who are closer to communities and can leverage local actor networks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use a Train the Trainer model to build capacity of selected community leaders who can make progress on technical work such as data and field information collection.</li> <li>• Leverage the relation with the 3 target sub-national governments to enlist their assistance with data and information provision.</li> </ul> <p>These measures are in addition to maximizing the use of virtual meetings with a wide variety of actors at the national and sub national levels to make progress on activities not based on field work. This includes government authorities, related international cooperation projects, NGOs and other actors.</p> <p>In the coming months, we expect policy and financial incentive activities that involve engagement with national and regional-level entities to take somewhat longer, but mostly be on track despite COVID due to the nature of the work.</p> <p>Field-based activities involving design of agroforestry modules with farmers will be seriously delayed, but the project consortium will make progress on the data-centered activities for pilot community identification and socioeconomic data collection from field-based staff. This will allow a phased approach for entry to rural communities that we hope can take place later in the year.</p>
Denmark	<p>53. Denmark takes note of the program. Given the target of ensuring that 50% of the funding goes to LDCs, we would strongly encourage the GGGI to develop a larger pipeline for projects in Africa. Further, it would be good if it could be clarified whether the work program reflects a greater focus on mitigation.</p>	<p>Agreed, though we note GGGI supports LDCs and other vulnerable countries, notably SIDS, outside Africa as well - we do agree we need to step up a larger pipeline for projects in Africa (and have taken steps to support this).</p> <p>We have indeed concluded our project portfolio, largely developed bottom up to reflect government demands, over-emphasizes mitigation and we have taken first steps to rebalance the portfolio.</p>

		<p>We have made significant efforts to develop a climate smart agriculture (CSA) portfolio for the last several years, particularly in Africa, which has resulted in a growing number of CSA projects starting in 2021.</p> <p>We also note that our large landscape portfolio, while having an important mitigation goal, also has a key role for adaptation.</p>
Hungary	54. In this section: Policy advisory assignments to be completed in 2021 by Hungary please correct the name of the developed strategy from National Clean Growth Strategy to <b>National Clean Development Strategy</b> .	Thank you for this correction which will be reflected going forward.
Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)	55. Work Program overview is fine. Presume that progress is linked to the Work Program items.	Yes, the midterm progress presented in the Annex 1 of the MPSC/2021/3 document is based on the 2021 work program policy adoption and investment mobilization targets to achieve by the end of 2021.

4. Strategy 2015-2020 Review		
Member	Questions/Comments	Responses
United Kingdom	56. Building on the point drawn out under lesson learned 2: The FCDO acknowledges that GGGI do considerable work on bankable projects but have also identified a need for better monitoring of the impact such projects achieve once GGGI exit the project. Capturing the results, lessons learnt and data from such projects will be necessary for monitoring GGGI's total impact.	<p>GGGI has been tracking the progress and implementation of green investments catalyzed from 2017 onwards. To date, our annual results reporting and the evaluation of the GGGI's green investment program in 2019 by IEU shows that two-thirds of these projects have progressed past the initial investment commitment stage and have secured funding and are undergoing various stages of implementation.</p> <p>GGGI recognizes that this is an important area yet challenging to implement since GGGI exits the process once it completes the process of taking a project to bankability i.e., receives a letter of intent (of financing implementation the project) from a public or private financier. "Evaluation of GGGI's Green Investment Services" conducted in 2019 by IEU recommended that the Institute's annual reporting should begin to include reporting on progress of projects</p>

		<p>after the initial investment commitment stage. GGGI's Management responded that it would continue its effort on assessing what happened after the exit stage. For the 2018 end-of-rear reporting cycle, GGGI piloted tracking "Committed Green Investments Mobilized Implementation Status". Moreover, GGGI's Management proposed that a regular post-exit monitoring mechanism be conducted on a quarterly basis with staff in country engaging with local stakeholders to understand whether investment commitment has transferred into disbursement. GGGI will explore other feasible approaches, such as factoring in relevant monitoring and reporting approaches during the project structuring phase with a view to capture key results and lessons learnt for ex-post assessment.</p>
	<p>57. Building on the point drawn out under lesson learned 3: Moving forward, FCDO and GGGI should work together to understand how GGGI can better leverage experiences and lessons from member countries they work within to inform the capacity building of other nations. Demonstrating evidence of strong results that can be replicated in other countries and leveraging learnings and findings across contexts</p>	<p>Thank you and GGGI looks forward to work with the FCDO on best ways to draw upon and leverage country experiences and lessons learned in context of promoting learning and capacity development in member countries. Currently, the country program and thematic evaluations of GGGI by IEU partly serves the purpose where lessons drawn in evaluations could inform design of capacity building activities. Going forward, evaluations by IEU will be (qualitatively) assessing transformative potential aspects of interventions to identify innovative policy and investment interventions that GGGI has implemented and that could/should be pursued for replication considering country contexts.</p> <p>In January 2021, the Investment and Policy Solutions Division (IPSD) has been restructured around a group of "Global Practices" and "Communities of Practices" aligned with the Global Operational Priorities and Programmatic Solutions outlined in Strategy 2030.</p> <p><a href="https://gggi.org/global-practice/">https://gggi.org/global-practice/</a>  <a href="https://gggi.org/thematic-strategies-communities-of-practice/">https://gggi.org/thematic-strategies-communities-of-practice/</a></p>

		<p>The functions of the “Global Practices” and “Communities of Practices” include, among others,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lead and ensure knowledge sharing / learning across the organization within the Programmatic Solution CoP/GP engagement area via for instance hosting/organizing workshops, webinars, and green bags for internal training.</li> <li>• Ensure internal and external visibility of the Programmatic Solution CoP/GP engagement area via various communications channels, as deemed appropriate.</li> <li>• Represent GGGI externally in global networks and develop relevant strategic partnerships within the Programmatic Solution CoP/GP engagement area.</li> <li>• Engage proactively new countries with currently no country program and/or a small or no program in the work of the Programmatic Solution CoP/GP engagement area.</li> </ul> <p>These functions respond to the matter of how GGGI can better leverage experiences and lessons from members to inform the capacity building of other nations and prompting global thought leadership. GGGI also welcomes inputs from members as to how this knowledge could be targeted to sub-regional, regional, and global dialogues that those members participate in.</p>
	<p>58. Building on the point drawn out under lesson learned 4 the FCDO would encourage GGGI to consider how to measure the extent to which GGGI’s knowledge-products are impacting the quality of its green growth policies and investment proposals. Moving beyond the 6-point scorecard currently used to assess knowledge products. GGGI should demonstrate that all its knowledge-based activities are improving the quality of its implementation in-country. GGGI should continue to examine how outputs are leading to impact for future results as well as retrospectively determining the level</p>	<p>Thank you and well noted. GGGI looks forward to work together with the FCDO in ways to assess the quality of knowledge product outputs through the next review of the UK FCDO results log frame. GGGI's knowledge products have been developed with one or more of these objectives in mind: advocacy and thought leadership to strengthen the case for green growth, publishing frameworks and tools that support monitoring, assessment and country implementation, and sharing of lessons learned and innovative approaches for capacity development of members.</p>

	<p>of impact achieved by past outputs. This needs to involve identifying where policies have been influenced by GGGI and which have actually been delivered. Furthermore, GGGI and FCDO should work together to establish a metric which can be used to measure the quality of all outputs.</p>	
Republic of Korea	<p>59. We commend that GGGI has made great achievements of all policy objectives established in Strategic Plan 2015-2020. Taking note of lessons described in the report, we encourage and look forward to GGGI to open a new chapter in the next decade with Strategy 2030.</p>	<p>Thank you – agreed.</p>
Denmark	<p>60. Denmark welcomes the review. Given the lessons learned, it would be good to hear some reflections on whether the number of planned projects is too high.</p>	<p>The number of planned projects is not too high. The rapid increase in number of projects is partly due to our growing program size, but particularly through the rapid diversification of donors and earmarked projects that require separate reporting and monitoring.</p> <p>To counter this increase in complexity, and ensure program coherence, the emphasis has shifted from project reporting to country program reporting, with a single impact pathway that demonstrates how multiple projects are designed to achieve a shared goal.</p> <p>In addition, program coherence is advanced through the definition of a relatively small number of programmatic solutions (replacing the overly broad thematic areas we had prior) ensuring that we focus more on replication and scaling up of specific solutions. Thus, we may have a larger number of projects, but with more consistency among them. Country programs focus on a limited number of programmatic solutions.</p> <p>Finally, GGGI has developed business processes and online tools to manage all steps in the project cycle in a systematic and</p>

		transparent manner, enabling the organization to manage the complexity that comes from handling the volume of projects that we see.
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5. Strategy 2030 Addendum (Part 1)		
Member	Questions/Comments	Responses
United Kingdom	61. The FCDO congratulates GGGI for their work on responding to the covid-19 crisis and recognizing the opportunity to integrate both climate and development objectives into recovery packages. GGGI's priority areas are well placed and provide a very strong basis from which member states can build back better in line with their domestic priorities. GGGI's capacity to quickly respond to shifting priorities in a highly uncertain environment highlight's their unique strength as a flexible and nimble organization.	Thank you.
	62. Table 2 outlines the imbalance in GGGI's current approach with significantly greater expected impact on mitigation centered targets such as SO3 compared to adaptation goals under SO6, poverty alleviation and income protection in the global south will rely strongly on improved resilience stemming from adaptation services. GGGI should explore opportunities to increase their adaptation portfolio.	<p>GGGI acknowledges that for our vulnerable countries (LLDC, LDC, SIDS) the increase in adaptation (with mitigation co-benefits) is the top priority.</p> <p>Beyond SO6 the efforts are measured under SO2 and part of SO3. For the Strategy 2030 implementation, several programmatic solutions cover adaptation and resilience building, and GGGI will continue efforts to scale up the supports to members and partners in collaboration with donors such as UK.</p> <p>One of the highest priorities for adaptation of our LDC members, particularly in Africa, is agriculture. GGGI has prioritized Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA), particularly for Africa, for several years and we have now built a significant portfolio of CSA projects, several starting implementation in 2021, and recruited new staff with CSA expertise.</p>

		<p>In addition, the new Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy establishes a link between adaptation and poverty eradication. As also mentioned in response to a similar question above: Adaptation is gaining focus internally. For the first time, a separate event on Adaptation was held at the March 2021 GGGI Annual Meeting and the CAID Unit has subsequently started a mapping of GGGI’s Adaptation initiatives (a brochure to be finalized by Q3). This mapping a start towards strengthening GGGI’s adaptation approaches, and to build a stronger narrative around our adaptation work to date. CAID Is also developing an approach to incorporate “resilience” into LEDS in recognition that our LEDS-related services are often undertaken in countries were adaptation takes priority. A methodology - which builds on experience on the same in Tonga and Fiji LEDS – will be first tested in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia with AFD funding.</p> <p>Indeed, a stronger focus on adaptation will resonate well particularly with LDC and SIDS members’ and partners’ priorities, and complements well the work undertaken under our Climate Diplomacy Program, which includes the LDC Initiative for Enhanced Resilience and Adaptation (LIFE-AR) and UNDP-EU Progressive Platform for Climate Action. (Reference MPSC Agenda Item 7 report).</p>
	<p>63. GGGI’s research on the job creation potential of renewable energy investments versus fossil fuels is a great example of a public good GGGI should aim to disseminate to maximize their influence on the global agenda. For the knowledge products listed under section 4.4. do GGGI have a track of how many times each resource has been downloaded/cited and/or any other metrics to measure how these products have been used to influence the global narrative around green growth.</p>	<p>Thank you, this is well noted. For the knowledge products, GGGI currently does not have tracking mechanism, however, thank for your suggestion, we will consider developing one.</p>

	<p>64. GGGI dedicate significant resources to waste management which sits within the broader circular economy framework, however the reports do not cover in any extensive detail what this programming looks like or why it takes such a significant portion of GGGI's budget. Could GGGI please expand on the underpinning strategy/evidence which has informed this focus on waste management?</p>	<p>GGGI's approach to defining the priorities in Strategy 2030 was guided by the needs of the members and partners expressed and discussed through series of consultations. Waste management is one of the programmatic solutions that came up as a priority for most of the countries, including in their NDCs. The prioritization process used also built on the experiences and lessons learned from the previous strategic plan 2015-2020, and the continuation of ongoing areas of work which present the potential to scale up, create green jobs and achieve climate impacts.</p>
	<p>65. Significant portions of GGGI's work on a green covid-19 recovery is in Latin America and Caribbean. Are GGGI exploring opportunities to increase the volume of similar projects in Africa and Asia?</p>	<p>Yes, as noted in the document, in the WPB 2021-2022, GGGI has systematically integrated the support to all members and partners on COVID-19 recovery into the planning.</p> <p>As noted in the response to Korea's question on the Results report, we do already have a large volume of green recovery projects in Africa and Asia. While all UK-PACT funded green recovery projects are indeed in LAC, 3 of the 4 QFFD funded green recovery projects are in the Pacific and Africa, with one in the Caribbean. Ten of thirteen of GGGI's core funded green recovery projects are in Asia, Pacific and Africa, and several more earmarked green recovery projects in the pipeline are outside LAC as well.</p> <p>In short, we believe we already have a strong portfolio of green recovery projects in LAC, Asia and Africa, and look forward to scale this work up through the Korea Green New Deal Trust Fund as well.</p>
<p>Norway</p>	<p>66. Carbon pricing and ensuring that the polluter pays are important tools to combat climate change. We are pleased to see this, as well as clear references to the Paris Agreement Article 6, included in the strategy. We believe this area of work represent a potential for further scaling up for GGGI, especially utilizing the organizations experience in designing bankable projects</p>	<p>Thank you.</p>

	and programs.	
	67. We are also pleased to see GGGI continue to build on already existing tools to green the recovery.	Thank you.
Republic of Korea	68. We are happy to confirm that the main elements of GGGI's Strategy 2030 are still valid even after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Korean government will continue our support for GGGI to follow through on the Strategy 2030.	Noted and thank you.
	69. We also welcome that GGGI aims to become a NetZero organization. To this end, it seems that GGGI sets an ambitious offset target of at least 30% according to the explanation on page 3. We are wondering whether GGGI could share its plan to offset the emission.	<p>GGGI will prioritize the reduction of its own carbon footprint first, before considering off-sets. Strategy 2030 sets a target of 40% reduction by 2030, which would be achieved without off-sets.</p> <p>In 2020, as a result of the COVID pandemic, our emissions reduced sharply, largely outperforming the 2030 target. As the resulting emissions could be offset through a very limited purchase of carbon credits (\$6K). We found a supplier of carbon credits linked to our work in Kalimantan (Indonesia) and retired the credits in Indonesia.</p> <p>Going forward we continue to prioritize reducing emissions and aim to sharply reduce travel and re-consider the culture of work (working from home) even post-COVID.</p> <p>We would like to become a carbon neutral organization from 2021 and are preparing a plan to be submitted to Council, for its approval, to be Carbon Neutral from 2021. This includes a more formal plan to both assess our emissions using an internationally accepted standard, efforts to reduce our carbon footprint, and a formal plan to offset the remaining emissions.</p> <p>If MPSC members wish to share their views or guidance on this topic it would be much appreciated.</p>

	<p>70. When it comes to the Carbon Pricing Program, it would be useful if GGGI could provide us with information on the outline and achievements of the two earmarked programs mentioned on page 19.</p>	<p>The Norwegian Ministry of Climate &amp; Environment funded DAPA (Designing Policy Approaches under Article 6) program is focused on the innovative area of ‘policy approaches’; transactions directly related to quantified emission reduction impact of national policies. This program is at the nexus of policy, trading and finance. After starting with a scoping stage in 2019, the program has now selected 4 countries for implementation (Indonesia, Morocco, Vietnam and Senegal), all of whom have confirmed commitment to compliance with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on any transactions (e.g. Agreement to Corresponding Adjustments). Having already agreed focus sectors in each country, the first stages of the policy selection for trade should complete this year. Work on approaches to additionality, baseline setting and agreed approach to impact channel modelling should also complete in 2021. Transactions are planned for 2022/23, but the workplan remains flexible due to the ‘first to market’ nature of the program.</p> <p>The Swedish Energy Agency funded MATS (Mobilizing Article 6 Trading Structures) program is focused on identifying, designing and completing transactions that are project based, expanding on the activities of the CDM of the Kyoto period. This program started in 2020, has completed scoping and has select 4 potential projects across 3 countries (Nepal, Ethiopia, and Cambodia). Capacity building is currently underway, project documentation being prepared around the activities and governance structure implementation starting in the first countries. Transactions are planned for 2022.</p>
<p>Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)</p>	<p>71. 2030 Strategy Addendum is well done. Suggest to consider inclusion of expected tangible results related to key items of the Strategy.</p>	<p>In the first chapter of the document, Strategy 2030 Key Features, the expected results are summarized in a text format. It reads as follows:  <i>“GGGI targets to mobilize over USD 16 billion in green and climate finance commitments for its Members. Our ex-ante attribution impact assessment estimates that at this scale, GGGI will support its Members to reduce Green House Gas (GHG) emissions by an</i></p>

		<p><i>estimated one million gigaton of CO2e, generate two million green jobs, provide sustainable services to 100 million people, save 0.5 million of hectares of forests and support 8 million people cope with climate change”</i></p> <p>As this is an Addendum to the Strategy 2030, the results are not in a table format like in the Strategy 2030 main document, so that we avoid repetition.</p>
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6. Regional Strategies		
Member	Questions/Comments	Responses
United Kingdom	72. What are the drivers behind the imbalance in GGGI’s distribution of funding across Asia, Africa and LAC, as described in table 1? Despite the significant additional spend in LAC we see very similar expected outcomes across both LAC and Africa (table 2) – is this due to the typology of countries across both areas with mitigation/adaptation impact harder to achieve in MICs vs LICs?	<p>Please kindly note that Table 1 outlines regional green investment mobilization targets as intermediate outcomes of GGGI technical assistance for 2021-25, <i>not distribution of funding across regions</i>. We apologize for the misleading title of the table 1 and we will correct it.</p> <p>Table 1 explains regional green investment mobilization targets by 2025. Asia with its foreseen growth of 17 countries will deliver 49%, Latin America with 12 countries will deliver 27%, and Africa with 12 countries to deliver 20% of the total investment mobilization target of 6.1 billion USD by 2025.</p> <p>The targeted investment mobilization will lead to 6 strategic outcomes in Table 2, reflecting differentiated investment priorities of the three regions. For instance, Latin America has larger solar investment pipeline while Africa has larger climate smart agriculture project pipeline. The higher investment target of Latin America by 455M in total than Africa for 2021-25 is expected to lead to slightly higher emissions reductions, while Africa’s climate smart agriculture deployment will lead to marginally higher green jobs and adaptation outcomes.</p>
	73. Across all regional strategies the FCDO would encourage GGGI to continue to develop a higher-level	We value and appreciate the encouragement for GGGI to pursue higher level cross-country approach with regional/multi-country

	<p>cross-country approach with a focus on regional/multi-country programming and forums for lesson learning. Working across countries where GGGI already has presence and leveraging existing relationships with regional bodies. The development of a regional approach will allow for a greater geographic footprint while operating within existing constraints and enable GGGI to develop thematic focused engagement for topics of interest that transcend borders. This approach will facilitate greater capacity for lesson learning and experience sharing across borders and will allow GGGI to demonstrate evidence of strong results that can be replicated in other countries and apply programmatic solutions across similar contexts. Balancing this aim with the need to create context specific solutions where necessary. When implementing such an approach GGGI should seek to coordinate with other organizations at the global, regional, and national level to avoid duplication of activities. GGGI and the FCDO should work together to identify milestones specific to this aim which can be tracked, and progress assessed against.</p>	<p>programming. We agree a regional approach can allow for a greater regional footprint without opening country offices in all new members.</p> <p>GGGI initiated a regional approach several years ago through the establishment of regional offices in Mexico City for LAC, Addis Ababa for Africa, Seoul for Asia and Fiji for the Pacific. We have gradually allocated more staff to the regional offices, significantly in the most recent reorganization of IPSD that took effect in 2021 in which a number of IPSD staff were relocated to the regional offices, and outposted from Seoul to the regions.</p> <p>GGGI has started developing regional programs with donors in the Pacific, in Asia and in Africa. This trend is set as a priority in implementing Strategy 2030 to scale up impacts.</p> <p>GGGI Secretariat is happy to work with FCDO to identify concrete milestones to track on the progress in this pursuit.</p>
Norway	<p>74. We are happy to see GGGI is moving towards a regional focus and strengthening integration and coordination of country programs at the regional level.</p>	<p>Thank you.</p>
Denmark	<p>75. With reference to our comment under item 3. above, Denmark would like GGGI to further explain the rationale behind the regional repatriation of country programs – i.e. 5 in Africa, 13 in Asia, x in Latin America.</p>	<p>It is clear that GGGI’s strength from the start was in Asia, but GGGI has invested in increasing members in Africa, to the extent our resources allow, and opportunities present themselves.</p> <p>GGGI has active country programs in Africa in Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Senegal and Burkina Faso, project offices in Morocco and Mozambique, a new member in Cote d’Ivoire where we have opened an office and are establishing a full country program. We have submitted earmarked project proposals for Angola and</p>

		<p>Zambia that will allow us to start operations in both countries when approved. We have this year also opened a project office in Togo (funded through a GCF Readiness project), and are following up expressions of interest from Ghana and Benin.</p> <p>In short, we foresee significant growth in Africa in coming years.</p>
	76. While it is positive that GGGI elaborates regional strategies, the presented documents do not present genuine strategic considerations for its course in the three regions over the coming years. Therefore, the documents the documents seem to be regional action plans rather than strategies.	The purpose of the regional strategies is to cascade Strategy 2030 for action at the regional level that are aligned with the programmatic solutions and SO impact targets for 2025, while taking into account the regional green growth, environmental and climate change challenges and pressing development issues.
	77. Denmark would welcome the inclusion of the following in each strategy: a) What is the overall analysis of challenges and opportunities in each region; b) based on the analysis in a), how can GGGI best add value and make a difference on the ground in light of parameters such as government demand, GGGI’s comparative advantage (generally and in each region), the comparative advantages of other actors and their ongoing interventions, etc. To be genuine strategies, GGGI should also consider including an actual theory of change.	<p>Thank you. These suggestions are well noted.</p> <p>GGGI is developing its regional approaches for the first time to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. cascade down the Strategy 2030 and the 5 year roadmap;</li> <li>2. reflect the operational growth and maturity of country programs; and</li> <li>3. capture opportunities to create synergies across individual country programs and scale up for larger impacts.</li> </ol> <p>This being the very first attempt of the organizational pursuit for regional strategies, we intend to continuous consult and be guided by the Council to deepen and strengthen strategy development, reflecting members’ diplomatic and strategic considerations in regional engagements. The presented three strategies have longer internal versions jointly developed with country offices and regional thematic officers, and they contain more detailed technical analyses of regional challenges and opportunities, and value-added interventions based on GGGI’s track records. Still, we agree these are not yet fully developed genuine strategies. We intend to further elaborate them in consultation with the Council.</p>
Ariyaratne Hewage	78. Agree with the Regional Strategies. Suggest to consider inclusion of a world map and indicate different	Thank you for your agreement on the Regional Strategies. We acknowledge the suggestion on including a visual map where

(NSA/Expert Member)	strategies of the countries in an appropriate manner.	country by country approach is mapped. We will reflect it during the finalization and publication after the MPSC discussion.
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<b>7. Update on NDCs, LTS and Green New Deal</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	79. The FCDO congratulates GGGI for their work on heightening ambitions in NDCs, the mainstreaming of gender and social inclusion issues into NDCs and the mapping of green recovery plans to NDC implementation.	Thank you.
Republic of Korea	80. Green Recovery is a timely subject as the world economy suffers from the ravages of the pandemic. To set up a resilient economy, we welcome GGGI's endeavor to align economic growth with the fight against climate change as highlighted in this Chapter.	Thank you.
	81. However, the campaign called 'Blue Skies and Net Zero 2050' seems to be off-the-topic. It should be separately dealt with under Net Zero efforts instead of NDCs enhancements. Moreover, this sub-chapter contains GGGI's efforts to outreach non-GGGI members such as the USA. It seems to be out of context as the campaign is irrelevant of outreach to non-GGGI members.	Noted. The intention was to see the Blue Skies and Net Zero 2050 campaign thematically in connection to Long Term Development Strategies, however we take note of these comments.
Denmark	82. Denmark welcomes the document. It would be welcome if more info could be provided on NDC enhancement, in particular whether this will phased out now that the NDCs should be submitted before Glasgow.	Support on the NDC revision process has extended into 2021 due to the delays facing many counties. The NDC Partnership CAEP and UNDP-EC Progressive Platform for Climate Action also proposed no-cost extensions as COP26 was postponed. In 2021 and beyond, GGGI continues to engage with members and partners on NDC Roadmaps and Financial Plans, sector level strategies, MRV and transparency in line with the Enhanced Transparency Framework, and of course NDC implementation throughout GGGI's value chain.  We note GGGI's policy and planning work, which initially focused on generic green growth plans, has de-facto shifted to more

		specific SDG, NDC, LEDS and Green Recovery related work. The heart of the work remains the same: supporting governments to green their national development planning, from specific plans such as NDCs, to more generic 5-year national development plans – and following that up with specific policies and investment projects.
	83. While we welcome that the work has been pursued in partnerships with other organizations, it would be interesting if the GGGI would inform MPSC why organizations such as IRENA and IEA were not included. Given the thematic and geographical focus of these organizations, one could possibly see synergies in a partnership on NDC implementation in particular.	We agree IEA and IRENA are indeed important partners for global policy and advocacy work – and we work with them on our green employment through RE investments, for example. The partnerships for NDC work were primarily established through the procurement process of the NDC Partnership. NDCP called for expressions of interest to meet the demand from developing countries and then assigned / allocated work in specific countries. That is how GGGI has partnered with GIZ, UNEP and WB on NDC activities in specific countries – and on NDC roadmaps with IRENA in Antigua and Barbuda. For NDC development and implementation a primary consideration is presence in the country in question, and while IEA and IRENA have a strong global presence, they have no, or very limited, presence in the field.
Hungary	84. On page 9 by Hungary please indicate the full title of our long-term strategy first: National Clean Development Strategy, and the use the abbreviation NCDS in order to avoid confusion.	Noted with thanks. The revision will be made here and in future communications.

<b>8. Review of GGGI's Green Investment Mobilization Efforts (Part 1)</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	85. The FCDO acknowledges that GGGI do considerable work on bankable projects but have also identified a need for better monitoring of the impact such projects achieve once GGGI exit the project. Capturing the results, lessons learnt and data from such projects will be necessary for monitoring GGGI's total impact.	GGGI fully agrees on the importance of tracking the social, environmental impacts of GGGI-generated projects. GGGI captures and examines this information in annual results reports and in evaluations of country programs or evaluations of GGGI's work within specific thematic areas.
	86. As described by figure 6 – why is GGGI's green investment portfolio so heavily skewed towards	Thank you for raising these points. There are several reasons for the large proportion of forestry projects. First, GGGI has from the

	<p>sustainable landscape projects? Despite only making up 22% of all projects (figure 7) sustainable landscapes make up over half of the value of GGGI's portfolio. Could GGGI please expand on the underpinning strategy/evidence which has informed this focus on sustainable landscapes?</p>	<p>outset focused strongly on this sector with significant support from especially the Kingdom of Norway and has accordingly built considerable capacity and expertise to support this area of work. Secondly, sustainable landscape projects are generally of a considerable size compared to the average size of projects in other thematic areas, representing over half of the total volume of finance commitments mobilized by GGGI. Finally, as shown in Figure 5, the proportion of the sustainable landscape projects of the total investment mobilization has dropped compared to other thematic areas over the course of 2015-2020.</p>
<p>Republic of Korea</p>	<p>87. We commend that it is a synthetic and well-organized report. We are on the same page that it is essential to develop projects that are financially, economically, and technically feasible to mobilize green investment. As the international community focuses on increasing and strengthening green finance, it is quite important for us to come up with a breakthrough to move forward. We are of view that GGGI could play an instrumental role in developing green growth projects well-suited to be financed.</p>	<p>Many thanks for these positive and supportive comments and observations. As noted in the new report, GGGI fully agrees on the need for accelerating and stepping up the flows of green climate investments in developing countries. Going forward we will increase our contribution to meeting the monumental funding challenge created by the Paris Commitments and the UN Sustainable Development Goals of 2030 by designing investible and bankable green projects and mobilize investor commitments. The experience in 2015-2020 demonstrates that GGGI contributes to this challenge and is well on track to a significant growth in investment mobilization in the next phase.</p>
<p>Denmark</p>	<p>88. It could be more clear how the mobilized finance is attributed to the GGGI.</p>	<p>Thank you for the comment. As noted already, the issue of attribution is important to GGGI, and we welcome comments and suggestions for additional clarity around our role in capital mobilization. In terms of this report, Chapter 2 lays out GGGI's 3-phase approach to project preparation and climate capital mobilization. Phase 3, Financing, is concluded when GGGI receives the signed Letter of Intent (LoI), MoU etc. The early-stage or initial commitment is proof of investor commitment to advance the project in the next phase and to drive it forward to reaching final legally binding commitment. Chapter 4 provides several in-depth examples of how GGGI staff concretely developed project concepts, designed actual projects, and mobilized suitable investors.</p>

		<p>However, if your question relates to attribution of climate finance to GGGI in terms of climate finance mobilized as part of the \$100 billion target set in the Copenhagen Accord and in the Paris Agreement under UNFCCC, then we are of the view that no climate finance will be, or should be, attributed to GGGI, as we are not the investor, but the arranger of projects.</p>
Hungary	<p>89. In Annex 2 at No. 31 the description of the program needs some modification, please correct it to the following:</p> <p>The program was designed to build a trust fund to finance a strong pipeline of green projects in the Western Balkans that covers the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Republic of Serbia. The Western Balkan Green Fund will be launched in 2022 and catalyze private sector investments by utilizing market-based approaches such as loans complemented with grants. <del>The Fund aims to attract investment primarily from the Visegrad Group and other central European countries.</del> In 2018, the Government of Hungary approved the establishment of the Western Balkans Green Center along with its financial provisions for three years to serve as an instrument to develop bankable projects in the region with the aim to provide project pipeline to the fund. GGGI carried out the design of the blueprint including the development of the financial instrument framework, the governance model, and monitoring and reporting frameworks <del>which led to US \$10.5 million funding from the Government.</del> The Government decision for the establishment of the fund is in progress.</p>	<p>Thank you for taking a close look at project no. 31. These suggestions will be fully reflected in the final report.</p>
Ariyaratne Hewage	<p>90. This is quite impressive.</p>	<p>Thank you.</p>

(NSA/Expert Member)		
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<b>9. Update on the Use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds in GGGI</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	91. How are GGGI leveraging experiences from the Green Innovation Fund (GIF) to inform the creation and design of new MDTFs?	The GIF has just launched and is only now beginning to operationalize activities in both the Caribbean and Pacific regions. Once activities are up and running GGGI will review the operations of the Fund with a view to analyzing what worked well and what lessons can be learned. This analysis will inform in the creation and design of new MDTFs.
Norway	92. Given the tasks to be undertaken by the Steering Committee it needs to be assessed if the SC has the capacity and competence to undertake these or if there needs to be some sort of advisory group (to assist e.g. preparing assessment and decisions on approval of projects) or Secretariat function to assist the SC.	We agree with this view and will assess the capacity of the SC to provide proper oversight on a case-by-case basis.
	93. It is important that the donor representatives also represent the donors that do not have their own seat. All donors need to have a voice in the SC.	We agree with this view and will ensure that all donors have a voice in the SC.
Republic of Korea	94. The establishment of MDTF increases the flexibility of GGGI, extending its scope. A few points can be further clarified for readers, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whether the membership to GGGI is a prerequisite to establishing the donor fund</li> <li>• What is the difference of setting up MDTF, considering the underlined similarities between MDTF and earmarked projects?</li> </ul>	Thank you. In response to your questions: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Donor Trust Funds at GGGI are established by GGGI, independent of donors. Once a Trust Fund exists, donors can contribute to it, independent of membership (same as for earmarked project contributions do from non-member donors).</li> <li>2. Legally, funding to a Trust Fund is “earmarked funding”, as every Trust Fund will have a specific substantive and or geographic scope, and GGGI is not free to use the Trust Fund resources as for core funding. Contributions to a Trust Fund are not as narrowly prescribed and detailed as a regular earmarked project, however, as GGGI can make proposals to the Trust Fund for its use. GGGI intends to account for Trust Fund contributions as “program</li> </ol>

		earmarked” funding. In addition, contrary to regular (bilateral) earmarked projects, MDTFs allow donors to pool funding for a specific purpose.
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<b>10. Accountability and Safeguards</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	95. The FCDO welcomes GGGI’s continued focus on gender and social inclusion and encourage GGGI to explore opportunities to expand reporting on results related to poverty eradication and gender inclusion. Specifically highlighting the impact GGGI programming has on marginalized groups. We encourage GGGI to further integrate gender sensitivity into their results framework, where possible, over and above simply collecting data which has been disaggregated by sex. GGGI may also wish to explore programmatic solutions which have gender inclusion as a part of the wider just transition as the core delivery objective.	<p>Thank you. This is a priority for GGGI and aligned with the new Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy 2021-2025 and Action Plan 2021-2022. Currently, as rightfully observed, we are applying Gender and Poverty Markers and sex disaggregating #of people benefitting from projects, however moving forward we continue to build capacity to better implement the already required gender and social inclusion assessments to identify opportunities for social co-benefits and marginalized groups in the context of each project. Following that, it the explicit articulation of project level outcomes and indicators for social inclusion, which is also required as a part of the Markers application process. Capacity to implement the processes established in the PCM needs to be further strengthened, and a training was rolled out with a Handbook and an instructional video in late May 2021. More initiatives are planned for 2021 and 2022.</p> <p>GGGI is also interested in exploring opportunities with members and partners for a portfolio of projects that have Gender, Poverty and Inclusion as Principal objectives.</p>
Norway	96. We appreciate the action taken to address important environmental and social concerns in project management. The safeguards and action plan seem well embedded and is actively applied, which is reassuring. We would like to challenge GGGI further to not only consider safeguarding as identification and management of risks in line with the principle of “do no harm”, but to also “do good” and promote and strengthen environmental and social concerns in	Thank you. Indeed, the principles of “do no harm” and “do good” are embedded in the GGGI Rules on Sustainability and Safeguards, and GGGI aims to push beyond minimum ESS management to achieve most social and environmental value of the green policies and assets developed. “Do good” is in a way of speaking embedded in GGGI’s definition of “green”, and GGGI’s Programmatic Solutions along with the new Gender and Inclusion Strategy aim to define desired impacts, as measured by proxy Strategic Outcomes at impact level and more targeted indicators at project level. The

<p>project design whenever applicable.</p>	<p>proposed Green Taxonomy is suggested to further strengthen GGGI's approaches to consider gains and potential trade-offs of green and climate actions. We welcome your continued support as we keep making incremental steps forward.</p>
<p>97. The Strategic Framework includes an improved Country Planning Framework guideline as first identification of context and priorities. As we understand it Country Planning Framework is primarily guiding for country programs. Are the same safeguards and screening assessments applied to project countries, regional and global programs as well?</p>	<p>Consideration for green growth potential and risks is applied throughout GGGI's Project Cycle Management (PCM), so for countries that do not have a Country Planning Framework (CPF) these elements and ESS management are incorporated into PMC2 and PCM3 Program Development processes and beyond toward monitoring (PCM4), evaluation and reporting (PCM5). We do not consider the absence of a CPF a safeguard risk.</p> <p>In addition, GGGI's Work Program and Budget is made up of country allocations, that means regional programs will generally be accounted for as contributions to the countries involved – and those contributions will be accounted for in the respective CPFs.</p>
<p>98. There is no mention of safeguards concerning anti-corruption or human rights. As GGGI often are embedded in governmental offices of the member countries, anti-corruption measures to address bribery and fraud would be important. Also, human rights are relevant to the work of GGGI. In particular the right to meaningful and informed participation and the rights of those most affected by climate change should be taken into consideration in GGGI's operations. We are aware GGGI has an anti-corruption policy. However, this is not reflected in the shared document, and we would like to ask if concerns related to corruption and human rights are integrated in the project management cycle?</p>	<p>This MPSC paper aimed primarily to highlight the most significant new developments in GGGI's Safeguards framework, hence it did not make specific reference to corruption and human rights (which were included already in earlier versions).</p> <p>However, it could be added that on Human Rights, the new Gender and Social Inclusion Strategy firms up GGGI's commitment to the principle of "leaving no one behind" and other human rights principles such as non-discrimination, meaningful participation and commitment to marginalized group including indigenous peoples. The Strategy also affirms GGGI's commitment to applying conflict sensitive approaches and promotion of peace. The value of the strategy is also to translate these principles into the context of GGGI's work and Programmatic Solution. An accompanying Gender and Inclusion Handbook version 1.0 was launched internally on May 31 with a training and instruction video, all with emphasis on project level social indicators, particularly focused on the equal distribution of benefits and representation of marginalized groups</p>

		<p>in decision-making and implementation. The Gender and Social Inclusion Action Plan 2021-2022 outlines further priorities to strengthen this component and building of internal capacity, the latter which is really a key priority in 2021-2022.</p> <p>On anti-corruption and implementation of relevant policies, GGGI the following mechanisms is in place:</p> <p>1. Prior to engagement with third parties, GGGI conducts due diligence review of third parties on integrity issues, including corruption. See the Rules on Integrity Due Diligence: <a href="http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2019/06/Rules-on-Integrity-Due-Diligence_16-June-2019.pdf">http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2019/06/Rules-on-Integrity-Due-Diligence_16-June-2019.pdf</a>.</p> <p>2. GGGI has a mechanism for reporting and investigation of allegations related to corruption. See the relevant policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Anti-Corruption Policy: <a href="http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/11/Anti-Corruption-Policy.pdf">http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/11/Anti-Corruption-Policy.pdf</a></li> <li>- Whistleblower Policy: <a href="http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/11/Whistleblower-Policy_02072015.pdf">http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/11/Whistleblower-Policy_02072015.pdf</a></li> <li>- Guidelines for GGGI Anti-Corruption Policy and Whistleblower Policy: <a href="http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/11/Guidelines-for-GGGI-Anti-Corruption-Policy-and-Whistleblower-Policy_02072015.pdf">http://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/11/Guidelines-for-GGGI-Anti-Corruption-Policy-and-Whistleblower-Policy_02072015.pdf</a></li> </ul>
	<p>99. GGGI plans to adopt a classification system for sustainable growth, mitigation, and adaptation. Although we understand the rationale for developing such a system, we question what is the added value is of this?</p>	<p>We generally assume that 100% of GGGI’s projects are “green” - but we have no formal taxonomy in place to define what are green / sustainable projects / activities. As we advise some of our members on the development of a green taxonomy, as was also adopted by the EU in 2020, and Korea plans to adopt in 2021, we believe it will become helpful (possibly required) in future to be able to demonstrate that our activities are aligned with the green taxonomies our donors use.</p>

	<p>100. GGGI has a strong agenda on supporting countries to transition into low-carbon economies. What is GGGI doing to reduce the carbon footprint of its own operations? Are there any policies on waste management, procurement or travel policy of which the intention of reducing the carbon footprint is strongly embedded? If so, we would like to see reporting on the effort GGGI is doing in this regard.</p>	<p>GGGI has adopted a number of policies and guidelines linked to Greening of GGGI operations, including guidelines for Green Events and Green Offices. (<a href="https://gggi.org/about/greening-gggi/">https://gggi.org/about/greening-gggi/</a>).</p> <p>GGGI renovated the new 3<sup>rd</sup> floor in Seoul HQ to meet LEED Gold standards and significantly reduce energy use.</p> <p>In Strategy 2030 GGGI set a target to reduce emissions by 40% in 2030.</p> <p>In 2020, GGGI was able to significantly reduce its carbon emissions, exceeding the 40% target in 2020. This was due to the decreased number of travels because of COVID-19 together with the continuing efforts of GGGI to make its operations greener and more sustainable. GGGI offices worldwide continued their efforts to achieve sustainable operations while also encouraging individual greening efforts and inspiring GGGI partners and communities to promote a sustainable future. Please see chapter 11 of the 2020 GGGI Annual Report titled ‘Greening GGGI’.</p> <p>In 2021 discussions have started on the changing culture of work – and travel – post-COVID19. We will propose changes to GGGI staff travel, to change an Annual in-person Staff meeting to once per 2 years (with virtual events in between).</p> <p>Likewise, GGGI is considering to propose to GGGI Council and Assembly to meet in person only once every 2 years (and virtually in the in-between year) and is inviting advice from MPSC on this point.</p> <p>Finally, GGGI would like to become NetZero in 2021, prioritizing the real reduction in emissions first, and possibly offsetting the remainder. The intent is to prepare a proposal to GGGI Council on</p>
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		this subject and GGGI would appreciate the views of MPSC on this subject (and will raise this under AOB in the MPSC meeting).
Republic of Korea	101. With regard to para. 6, GGGI's six strategic outcome is to be aligned with the so-called 'major' SDGs. Our understanding is that all seven-teen goals are equally important and major in this sense.	Fully agreed. This was meant to indicate SDGs with direct relevance to GGGI Strategic Outcomes (and demonstrate alignment).
	102. Moreover, welcoming the first attempt to segregate by sex the 'number of people benefitting from GGGI projects' as explained in number 14, we note that gender marker plays an important role in improving the inclusiveness of projects.	Thank you.
Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)	103. Very relevant piece and suggest to give wide publicity to it.	Comment noted with thanks; and, agreed. Communication about GGGI's commitment to Environmental and Social Safeguards is in itself an act of accountability. The website is currently housing GGGI's commitments and policies. The adoption of the Taxonomy mentioned in the document will provide an opportunity to (re)consider how we present the improved framework to the public.

<b>11. Update on Membership, Accession and Country Programming</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	104. Paragraph 9 states that GGGI will phase out core funding and GGGI Country Office presence in countries that are not a Member and that have not concluded an agreement on privileges and immunities by December 31, 2020. Which countries fall into this category?	<p>The China Country Office was closed in 2020.</p> <p>The Thailand Country Office was phased out in 2020 and GGGI is exploring opportunities to reinstate a project or country office if funding opportunities allow.</p> <p><i>The Mozambique Country Office</i> has been phased out in January 2020 and since then GGGI operates only on earmarked resources (GCF, Enabel project office. GGGI's presence is limited to project staff managed by the Africa Regional Office in Addis Ababa. Since 2020, the Mozambique government is taking visible steps to fulfil membership and HCA, possibly within 2021.</p>

		<p>In 2020, <i>Morocco Country Office</i> has been downsized to project office fully operating on earmarked (mainly GCF, NDC-P, Norway, Klik foundation). Project office is managed by one Country Lead and one more project staff supported by HQ (Carbon Pricing Unit) and the Africa Regional Office in Addis Ababa. Membership and HCA remain in advanced stage of confirmation.</p> <p>The <i>Myanmar Country Office</i> operations have been suspended in 2021.</p>
	<p>105. Given the expected increase in membership, GGGI may wish to develop a higher-level regional approach as discussed under item 6.</p>	<p>Agreed. Membership is decoupled from country programming, meaning that not all members of GGGI will require the establishment of a country office. In Strategy 2030, GGGI has thought of better serving certain members' needs, through specific time-bound, tailored interventions that are designed, implemented, and managed as part of global or regional programs without the need of having a country office and bearing the related costs. Some of these programs will be managed at the regional level.</p> <p>Also, as mentioned in the comment, the Regional Strategies will outline region-specific objectives, seek synergies between countries, and drive strategic engagement with regional-level donors, financial entities and actors to maximize GGGI's impact.</p>
Norway	<p>106. GGGI has concluded privileges and immunities with 19 Members as of September 2020, compared with 6 in October 2016. It is encouraging to see that good progress in made on this important issue.</p>	<p>Thank you. This progress reflects the trusted relation with our members and the value they perceive in GGGI's work. In fact, we have signed 21 total as of March 2021, adding Qatar and Uzbekistan, and expect to sign #22 with Cote d'Ivoire before the end of June.</p>
	<p>107. We support GGGI's decision to focus in-country programming in Members that have in place an effective agreement on privileges and immunities as it demonstrates the dedication and commitment by the member countries and is important for the security of GGGI's staff.</p>	<p>Thank you.</p>

<p>108. GGGI continue to expand its operations. Norad has previously expressed concerns of spreading the resources to thin. We see however, that GGGI are successful in achieving results and may have the capacity to expand even further. We do want to stress the importance of considering cost efficiency and value for money when scaling up and expanding. How can GGGI best take use of the available resources to make an impact?</p>	<p>We agree a keen focus on cost efficiency and value for money is important. GGGI seeks to maximize impact with its core resources in two ways:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Securing earmarked funding for country program expansion. This is built on in-country and global experience as well as strategic outputs for policy and investments that respond to government priorities and provide opportunity for new project creation; and</li> <li>2. Working in alliance with in-country and global institutions that expand GGGI's reach and provide complementary efforts to scale up impact. This occurs in GGGI's projects with the Kingdom of Norway in sustainable landscapes.</li> </ol>
<p>109. How do the country program and project country differ in terms of input of resources and the efficiency of responding to member countries' needs? Likewise, how efficient are the regional and global programs at responding to countries' needs? Has GGGI made any assessment of what approach is most cost efficient?</p>	<p>A project office is limited to implementing one or several earmarked resource funding project(s), and is generally led by a project leader, supervised by the regional office.</p> <p>A country office is led by a Country Representative, operates a country program, with an allocation of core resources in the GGGI WPB, to the extent such resource is available. Operations in the country are directed through the Country Planning Framework (5 years) and Country Business Plan (2 years, aligned with WPB).</p> <p>A project office is a more limited operation that may serve either as a steppingstone to the establishment of a country office, i.e., phasing in, or be part of phasing out (when a country office is closed but earmarked projects have not yet ended).</p> <p>GGGI has three stages in the development of country operations. The first stage – Phase-In stage – takes place during the first two years of operations, with 1-2 projects. This is the stage of establishing GGGI's presence, building networks, and developing the plans for the future programming. Consequently, the budget is small.</p>

		<p>Country programs are usually in the second stage – Strengthened and consolidated stage – or in the third stage – Scale-up or expansion stage – with larger operations and budget.</p> <p>There is no difference in the delivery model between a project and country office, and both can respond well to members’ needs. A regular “country program” remains GGGI’s primary – and in our view most effective – operating model.</p> <p>As we are unable to have country programs in all member countries, we are experimenting with alternative delivery models, i.e. project offices, as well as regional and global programs. Experiments with delivery of services through global programs has led to a shift towards regional programs and the establishment of Communities of Practices (as de-facto successors of global programs).</p> <p>As global programs (and Communities of Practice) are designed as part of Strategy 2030 to step-up results and accelerate impacts, it is too early to assess these alternative delivery modalities. The mid-term review of the Roadmap 2021-2025 in 2023 will be a good time to do the assessment.</p>
	<p>110. The Strategy 2030 Roadmap 2021-2025 outlines the evolution of operations across three specific phases. GGGI will “phase out core funding and GGGI Country Office presence in countries that are not a Member and that have not concluded an agreement on privileges and immunities by December 31, 2020”. There is no mention of an exit strategy however. What other criteria do GGGI have to decide when to phase out funding?</p>	<p>The exit strategy is part of the plan that will be set for the countries for which the decision is made to phase out, i.e. it is designed for each country taking into account local conditions. A structured process is put in place in consultation with government counterparts based on the agreed next steps. GGGI uses the criteria defined in the country programming criteria approved by the Council.</p>
<p>Republic of Korea</p>	<p>111. It is very impressive that the membership to GGGI has expanded since the establishment of GGGI. The update is overall well-written. However, on phrase</p>	<p>Agreed. As GGGI had ongoing projects and international and national staff in Myanmar we have followed this situation very closely, ensuring the safety of our staff and aligning our position</p>

	raises our concern. The recent situation in Myanmar cannot be simply referred as 'the recent change in government'. The international community reiterates its deep concerns on the development in Myanmar and strongly condemned the violence against peaceful protesters. We propose changing the phrase into 'the recent development'.	with the UN and other development partners. We have moved our international staff out of Myanmar and suspended operations.
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<b>12. Revisions to the MPSC Terms of Reference</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	112. The FCDO endorses the proposed edits to the MPSC terms of reference.	Thank you.
Republic of Korea	113. We agree on the revised MPSC ToR. Thank you for this.	Thank you.
Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)	114. Agree with the proposed TOR revisions.	Thank you.

<b>13. Upcoming Elections of the Council for 2022-2023</b>		
<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	115. The FCDO proposes the MPSC recommends to the secretariat that Mr Ban Ki-moon serves a third two-year term as Expert/Non-State Actor Member of the Council and President of the Assembly & Chair of the Council.	Thank you.
Republic of Korea	116. Korea has engaged in consultations with the UK, Norway and Denmark and all have supported the idea on Mr. Ban serving another term as P&C. We hope that the needed procedure will be reported to the MPSC so that a recommendation can be made by MPSC to Council.	Thank you.
Ariyaratne	117. I am pleased to inform my interest in continuing to	This is well noted.

Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)	serve as an NSA member of the Council.	
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<b>14. Update on the 10<sup>th</sup> Assembly and 14<sup>th</sup> Council Joint Session</b>		
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<b>Member</b>	<b>Questions/Comments</b>	<b>Responses</b>
United Kingdom	118. The FCDO would recommend option 2.	Noted.
Republic of Korea	119. Korea is flexible on the timing for the Assembly and Council. We will accommodate the schedule that is agreed on.	Noted.
Ariyaratne Hewage (NSA/Expert Member)	120. Agree with the update of 10th Assembly and 14th Council joint Session. Wish that we could meet in person after controlling the covid pandemic as early as possible.	Thank you and agreed.
Denmark	121. Denmark would welcome if H.E. Ban Ki Moon would offer to serve as chairman for a third term.	Thank you. President and Chair Ban has indicated he is willing to serve.

General Comments from Hungary	122. As a general comment please correct the name <b>Hungary-Balkan Regional Multi Donor Trust Fund</b> to <b>Western Balkan Green Fund</b> in the documents.	Thank you for the comment. We will correct the name in all documents going forward.
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